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THE REQUIREMENT FOR AND SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENT OF
A TRAINING SCHEME FOR THE OFFICERS AND STAFF OF
THE BRITISH ARMY 1799 - 1858.

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A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

MAJOR NA LEADBETTER MBE REME
BSc(Eng) Royal Military College of Science
Shrivenham, England, 1977

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1990

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency of The United States of America and The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

THE REQUIREMENT FOR AND SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENT OF A TRAINING SCHEME FOR THE OFFICERS AND STAFF OF THE BRITISH ARMY 1799 - 1858: A Study of the Evolution of the Military Training System for British Officers from the Original Proposals for a Military College of Three Departments to the Establishment of the Staff College, by Major NA Leadbetter MBE REME, British Army, 156 pages.

This study is an historical analysis of the military training scheme for British officers which was proposed by Major General John Gaspard Le Marchant in 1798 and adopted by the British Army in 1799. It examines the social and political climate of the time and discusses the organisation of the British Army at the start of the nineteenth century. The influence of senior military leaders, the Government and the Crown during the formative years is investigated in detail. The employment of the staff in war is also described..

Some conclusions which may be drawn from this study are: the scheme was pro-active during a time of reform; the influence of government ministers was intrusive; the momentum gained during the first fifteen years was lost between 1815-1854; the Crimean War showed the inadequacies of the military planning staff; the scheme was successful in achieving the aims set for it by Le Marchant.

The study concludes that Le Marchant's proposals, modified by the Military Committee in 1800, were sound. Military education should be broad-based. The scheme stagnated during peace. The Staff College resulted from an appreciation of the inadequacies of what was basically a sound system which had been neglected.

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NA LEADBETTER MBE REME
May 1990

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

There are many questions and criticisms which surround the various teaching methods employed by the main military training colleges around the world today. For example many United States Army officers find it difficult to understand the full value of the short, essentially military, commissioning course for the British Army held at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. At the same time probably an equal number of British officers do not fully understand the selection system for officer training in the United States Army which appears to be based more upon academic achievement than upon the physical and mental characteristics that are generally thought to indicate a potential for leadership.

It is interesting to note that the curriculum established for the education of army officers in Great Britain was, during the early years of the training scheme in the nineteenth century, based upon mathematics, languages, science and sketching. There was relatively little emphasis placed on the development of leadership skills or on the instruction of tactics, the threat, or military capabilities - in short there was no tactical doctrine, which is described by the British Army today as:

Tactical doctrine is a common foundation on which commanders are to base plans authoritative fundamental principles which require judgement in their application.(1)

The duration of training courses, the selection of students, the importance placed upon certain subjects and the measures of the success (and failure) of the students are as significant now as they were when the officer training scheme described in this paper was first mooted in England in 1798. Training schools must always be in a state of flux as new techniques for instruction are developed and as the social climate either encourages voluntary participation or decries it. The various qualifications for entrance to, and graduation from, such schools must change in line with the knowledge and capabilities of the students on entry, their perceived requirements and the evolution of military studies. The changes at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, and the Staff College, Camberley, that are demanded as part of what is almost an annual exercise today, are a continuance of the evolutionary process that began at the Royal Military College when it was established between 1799 - 1802. An appreciation of the start of this process will help in understanding the rationale behind the modern training scheme, which tends to lay equal emphasis on broadening the mind through academic instruction, developing the characteristics required of a leader and teaching the principles of the military profession.

The focus of research has been tied to the perceived need for some form of rationalised training scheme for the officers of the British Army at the turn of the eighteenth century. There were many parallel issues which also affected the establishment of a military

training system; including political, social, technical and economic. Investigation of each of these was necessary to discover the reasons for the disputes that existed between the enthusiastic advocates for change and the prejudiced conservative majority.

It was important to define some restrictions on the areas for discussion before beginning the research and these were as follows:

The thesis should only be concerned with the formation and development of the Royal Military College between the dates specified in the title. However there would be a need for some historical background to help the reader understand how the Army was organised at the time; this would deal particularly with the system of purchase and the division of the Army into two distinct parts, the technical corps and the line regiments.

The thesis will not be concerned with the strategy, operational art or tactics of any of the battles and engagements that took place during the Peninsular and Crimean wars. Examples would be used only to emphasise the need for and use of trained officers in the stead of untrained and inexperienced men. This latter issue was particularly important to the architects of the new training scheme as it underscored what they saw as the scheme's essential function - to develop a professional attitude in young officers.

Personalities would be discussed only if they had a direct impact on the establishment of the College, its curriculum and further development.

The absence of the word *professional* from the title deserves some explanation as it was a significant matter for debate during the early stages of preparing the proposal for the thesis. The original title included the phrase, "...value and influence of the professionally trained staff officer...." but it was decided to abandon this in favour of the existing title for the following reasons (2):

The word *professional* can be used to mean a number of different things today. Its true meaning (3): "pertaining to a profession (an employment not mechanical and requiring some degree of learning)", refers more to the nature of the training rather than to the purpose of it. It was the purpose of the training which was of which was of primary interest in researching this subject as the re-drafted title makes clear.

Where the word *professional* is used in the text it is meant to imply a self-determined effort to improve the individual's understanding of, and ability in, his chosen profession.

The main research questions of this thesis focus on the reasons behind the scheme and how it was developed:

Why was there such antipathy towards a scheme that would better educate the Officer Corps and why were the changes that were recommended during the evolution of the system often ignored?

The Junior Division gradually earned the respect of the regiments but the Senior Division was allowed to decay despite Royal patronage and the generally held view that it was a valuable and worthwhile institution. What were the reasons for this anomaly and how was the Staff College (as it was to become) saved from decay, finally to earn due recognition?

This thesis is a study of the formation of a system of military education that is continued within the British Army(4) today. The central thoughts behind this work are the reason why, in an era which was marked by influence and personal wealth, Great Britain should establish two great institutions of military learning and what successes they enjoyed during their formative years. Every Army needs an officer corps, as every organisation and business needs a management staff. It is purely logical to suppose that there is a requirement to train the members of these select and perhaps obscure bodies of men. The profession-of-arms is one of the oldest forms of honest employment in

the world but the formal training of men to command and control large ground forces is a relatively modern business. The concept dates back probably no further than the American War of Independence and is usually taken to have started at the end of the eighteenth century(5). A significant change in the organisation and character of the Army came about during the first half of the nineteenth century. This period saw a slight decline in the effect of personal influence on advancement in the Officer Corps and a gradual awareness of the importance of a professional approach to the study of war. If the significance of these changes is to be properly understood it is important to look back, albeit briefly, to the formation of a standing army in 1685 and the system of purchasing commissions, which was to form the backbone of the British regimental system for nearly two hundred years until it was finally abolished in 1871. The origins and history of the purchase system is exceptionally well documented(6) and the mechanics of its employment will not be discussed in this paper.

The period of English history known as the rule of the major-generals when Oliver Cromwell, the Lord Protector, divided the Country into eleven military districts was abhorrent to most Englishmen and particularly to members of the landed class whose authority had been severely diluted. When Charles II was invited to take the Throne in 1660 his main concern was that the country should never be split by civil war again. Part of the solution to this problem was to ensure that all men who carried the responsibility and power of commanding men-at-arms should have such a high stake in the country that war at home would be entirely self-destructive(7). At the same time it was

important that these officers should be able to afford to raise the bodies of men they were to command and also to clothe, arm and feed them when necessary. Officers then were required to purchase a regimental commission which could be sold at a later date, thereby reducing the demand for pensions from the state. The result was that the country got a substantial army at virtually no cost to the tax-payer - an altogether admirable situation.

The level of patronage exhibited in the granting of commissions and subsequent promotions was certain to be severely criticised in the end. The Duke of Marlborough, who had fought the successful campaigns in Bavaria and the Low Countries during the Spanish War of Succession, was exceptional in that he had sought merit in his officers rather than influence. An example of his strength of purpose was the appointment of William Cadogan, the son of an unknown Dublin lawyer, as his Quartermaster-General in the Low Countries in 1701. After a string of victories (Marlborough did not lose a single major engagement) Britain came to a position of influence which had never before been achieved. It is not surprising that the aftermath of such success should be an unrealistic sense of security which resulted in neglect of the Army. With the passing of the influence of Marlborough, nepotism returned in full flood. Francis Grose, a contemporary military humorist wrote an article on patronage in 1789. Entitled "*Advice to the Officers of the British and Irish Armies*" he had the following to say about the General officers on the staff:

If any appointments happen to fall within your disposal, be sure to give them all in your own regiment and to persons who do not want them, and are incapable of doing the business. The less they are qualified to act, the greater the obligation to you, and the more evident the demonstration of your power. It will show that your favour is sufficient to enable a man to hold and to discharge any office, however deficient his knowledge of the duties.(8)

By the end of the eighteenth century The British Army had been reduced to the verge of incompetence by the very system which, in 1685, had determined to keep politically ambitious professional men out of the officer corps. The American War of Independence, lost by a superior force of trained soldiers against what was supposed to be a disorganised rabble, showed the severity of the cracks in the British system. Twelve years later the ill-fated Flanders expedition confirmed that the British Army, in particular the Officer Corps, was in considerable disarray. The commander of the campaign, the Duke of York, was only 30 years old and had never before commanded even a battalion in the field. During the battle of Cassel Major General Craig, Adjutant-General to the Duke of York, wrote the following indictment to Sir Hugh Dalrymple, Military-Secretary to the Commander-in-Chief (Lord Amehurst):

That we have plundered the whole country is unquestionable; that we are the most undisciplined, the most ignorant, the worst provided army that ever took the field is equally certain: but we are not to blame for it ... (The fact is) there is not a young man in the Army that cares one farthing whether his commanding officer, the brigadier or the Commander-in-Chief approves his conduct or not. His promotion depends not on their smiles or frowns. His friends (family) can give him a thousand pounds with which to go to the auction rooms in Charles Street and in a fortnight he becomes a captain. Out of the fifteen regiments of cavalry and twenty-six of infantry which we have here, twenty-one are literally commanded by boys or idiots ... we do not know how to post a picquet or instruct a sentinel in his duty; and as to moving, God forbid that we should attempt it within three miles of an enemy!(9)

The British military system was secure within the constraints of eighteenth century society; a society divided by wealth and education. The Army itself comprised the guards and line regiments of infantry and cavalry which were, together, commanded by the Commander-in-Chief. A separate organisation, the Ordnance (technical) Corps was administered by the single staff of the Master-General of the Board-of-Ordnance. There were, then, basically two armies in Great Britain during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries until 1855 when they were finally amalgamated. Not only was the chain-of-command different but the officers and soldiers wore different uniforms and, from 1741, the officers of the Ordnance corps which included both the artillery and the engineers, had been trained at the Royal Military Academy Woolwich.

As every enterprise has its beginning so the training of future commanders of the Army began as an idea which was developed through the whims of a number of military men, politicians, bureaucrats and academics. Some of those involved in the planning and organization of the training scheme were interested only in personal advancement or financial gain; indeed the Prime Minister, William Pitt, fell, at least in part, within the latter category(10). Others were convinced that the state of the Army was such that drastic measures had to be taken to improve matters, particularly the professional abilities of the commanders - at least at the lower levels. A number of arguments about the need to educate officers had raged through Horse Guards as a result of the original proposals to found a military school for non-technical officers made by the Master-General of the Ordnance (the Duke

of Richmond) in 1796. In fact the noise was so great that the Duke had dropped the idea. It took the strong commitment of a relatively unknown man, Lieutenant Colonel John Gaspard Le Marchant, to breathe new life into the project.

The forerunner to the Staff College, Camberley, opened its doors in 1799 and the first school for non-technical potential officers of the Army was finally established by Royal Warrant in 1802. There have been considerable changes to the method of military education since, but the birth of the present-day Officer Corps as a recognized professional body can be traced directly to Le Marchant's plan. At the time of its inception, the whole of Europe was in uproar; The French Revolutionary Army threatened the entire continental land-mass of Europe and only the strength of the Royal Navy protected Great Britain from invasion. The Army had been defeated in 1795 during the abortive Flanders' Campaign and the resulting disarray was a culmination of 20 years of weak control and feeble command on the part of the aged, infirm and incompetent Lord Amhurst, the Commander-in-Chief. Fortunately the King insisted that his younger son, the Duke of York, should succeed Amhurst in Horse Guards. A poor commander in the field, he proved to be a very able administrator and under his hand corruption, intrigue and idleness were replaced by a new determined effort to improve the quality of the Army, its officers and staff organization. The formation of a military college for the professional training of British officers who would serve with their regiments and on the staff was recommended to the Commander-in-Chief in 1798 by Le Marchant, a young cavalry officer,

during a period of crisis. He had already achieved two quite notable successes in this field of professional reform a few years earlier when, in 1795, his design for a new cavalry sabre had been adopted along with a ninety-page manual of sword exercises(11). However this new proposal was of a more radical nature as it described a complete training scheme and its implementation was hampered by mistrust amongst some of the more senior officers and an unsupportable belief that things were all right within the Officer Corps. The Duke of York wrote to Le Marchant immediately after receiving a copy of the original proposal. He was seriously concerned that individual prejudices amongst the politicians and generals would thwart any initiative of the sort proposed in Le Marchant's paper. It was clearly his view that some reform in military education was overdue and he encouraged Le Marchant to distil his arguments and demonstrate the value of his ideas(12).

Le Marchant had arrived on the scene at a favourable time and he weathered the storms of protest created by his radical ideas. There were various debates about the dangers of advancing the cause of militarism in England and whether it was desirable to allow the Army to emulate the professional training of the Royal Navy's midshipmen at Portsmouth. The arguments served as a smoke screen to hide the real purpose behind the scheme which was, simply, to improve the professionalism of the new arrivals within the Officer Corps. The aims were clear and Le Marchant had gained the support of the Commander-in-Chief at an early stage. However, introduction of the planned training scheme was delayed by the appointment of a military committee which was to investigate whether it was plausible. The Committee was formed on the

order of the Prime Minister and the Duke of York presided. Of necessity the Committee was very thorough and demanded details concerning costs, staff, accommodation, curriculum and students from Le Marchant. Even after all the queries had been answered satisfactorily, the Committee decided that only two out of the original proposal of three separate departments, which included a school (the Legion) for the sons of non-commissioned officers, should be formed. The recommendations were sent to the Prime Minister who agreed to put them to Parliament for a final decision and the authority to establish the remaining departments. The Senior Department (later to become the Staff College) was inaugurated by Royal Warrant on 24th June 1801 and one year later, on 4 May 1802, the Junior Department came into being. The Senior Department had as its only aim the improvement of the Army staff, the Junior Department was to educate (13) officer cadets between the ages of thirteen and seventeen years in the sciences and to train them in their basic duties as officers. The education of young officers was, in Le Marchant's view, to be broadening in much the same way that university education was. He concluded that the most valuable sort of education was all embracing and that a wide range of academic studies should be pursued in both of the approved training departments of the new Royal Military College.

This period, 1798 - 1815, was a watershed for the dominant armies of Europe. From the social upheaval of the French Revolution there spread a fever of egalite with scant regard for fraternite throughout Europe which had to be contained if the old order was to survive. France and Prussia had already taken significant steps towards

improving the professionalism of their respective armies. Frederick the Great had already founded the *Kriegsschule* (also known as the *Academie des Nobles*) in Berlin in 1765; a military school which was later reorganised by Scharnhorst in 1808(14) to form a two-tiered school for officers based upon the British model. The French Army, having discarded a large amount of 'dead wood' from its officer ranks during the Revolution, was in a strong position as its command element was streamlined and relatively efficient. A new technical school - *l'Ecole Polytechnique* was established in Paris in 1794 for the instruction of the sciences and engineering.

It is interesting to note that one thread ran through each of these armies and their individual attempts to structure and educate their respective officer corps. The thread was in the form of a Frenchman, General Francis Jarry(15), who had fought with the Prussians in 1765 and was appointed to be the first Governor of the new *Kriegsschule*. He later returned to France where he held a command under General Dumouriez at the battle of Jemappes but his sympathy for the soon-to-be disgraced Dumouriez forced him to leave France for England. Jarry was to be the first Superintendent of the Senior Department of the Royal Military College and he would give lectures, in French, to young British officers about tactics and operational art which, if they understood him well enough, they would later use to fight Napoleon's forces in Spain and Portugal.

Once established the scheme seemed to work quite well in spite of budget difficulties and problems with the curriculum and the staff

that were supposed to teach it. However, it is interesting to note that the officers who had received two years of staff training (the length of the course was reduced to one year in 1821) within the Senior Department were not always selected to serve on the Adjutant or Quartermaster-General's staff. When a campaign was fought by the British Army during the nineteenth century, the officer ordered to command the expeditionary force was allowed to appoint his own staff officers. These officers had probably not received any formal instruction in the science and art of warfare unless they had been to one or more of the military training establishments at Woolwich (established 1741), Sandhurst (established 1802) or High Wycombe (established 1801). The nature of their selection for duty suggests that they might be regarded more as members of a 'personal' rather than a 'general' staff although it is in the latter category that they are correctly placed. During the Crimean War Lord Raglan, the Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Army to the East appointed his own Adjutant-General and Military Secretary as well as a host of Aides-de-Camp. Senior tactical commanders were not necessarily any better prepared; during the same war Lord Cardigan had certainly received no formal training and yet he commanded the Light Brigade while his brother-officer and despised cavalry commander, Lord Lucan, had only gained a little experience while serving with Prince Woronzow of the Russian Army against Turkey in 1829. The lack of planning for the Army in the Crimea bears testimony to the need for a dedicated staff at that time. The reasons for the apparent failure of the scheme in 1854, and the measures taken to reform officer training up to 1858, are discussed in chapters three and four.

A large amount of the material which helped the preparation of this thesis appeared almost immediately; a varied selection of published works in the form of books and articles. Most of these describe the mechanics of the formation of the two departments of the Royal Military College and the parts played by the military and political leaders of the time. The Duke of Wellington was of considerable interest as the first user of the raw officers who emerged from the Junior Department. His lack of enthusiasm for the product of the Senior Department is curious; particularly as his most valued staff officer and Quartermaster-General, Lieutenant Colonel George Murray, had been a voluntary student in the third intake in 1801(16). The search for resource material extended to the period of the Crimean War of 1854-1856; which immediately preceded the changes recommended by the Council of Military Education in 1857 which resulted in the formation of the Staff College.

The history of the Junior Department is well documented in the Sandhurst Library. Unfortunately it was not possible to get hold of the letters and military papers (1800-1811) of Le Marchant which are held by the Library, or of his letters from Flanders and the Peninsular which are in the keeping of the Le Marchant family. Primary sources were not available on this side of the Atlantic but the Sandhurst Curator, the custodian of the history of the Academy, and the Senior Librarian both offered considerable help and advice during the early part of the research. A privately published biography of Le Marchant, written by his son, Sir Denis Le Marchant, in 1841, was loaned by the Library and was immensely useful in putting the more personal views of the

architect of modern military education in Great Britain. The *Panare Papers* were invaluable in setting the record straight concerning the determination of the Duke of Cambridge to reform the Senior Department in 1857 and to make best use of what it had always offered. Secondary sources, mostly available through the Combined Arms Research Library, were voluminous and led to the investigation of a number of issues not directly related to the research questions; a detailed bibliography is attached. Some volumes, particularly the biography of Le Marchant, contain interesting hand-drawn sketches and maps completed during campaigns. These lend credence to the importance placed on sketching at both the Junior and Senior departments and some are reproduced at *Appendix 1*.

CHAPTER 1 - ENDNOTES

1. British Army publication prepared under the direction of the Chief of the General Staff. Design for Military Operations - The British Army Doctrine, pp.3-4.
2. Private letters from: Head of the Department of Defence and International Affairs at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, Dr J Sweetman; Sandhurst Curator, Dr TA Heathcote TD; Senior Librarian at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, AA Orgill Esq.
3. Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary, edited by Dr AM Macdonald.
4. The generic term Army will be used to describe the British Army throughout.
5. Brian Bond. The Victorian Army and the Staff College, p.8 (Samuel P Huntington. The Soldier and the State, p.19.).
6. Anthony Bruce. The Purchase System in the British Army 1660-1871, pp.6-40.
7. Ibid. p.17.
8. AR Godwin-Austen. The Staff and the Staff College, p.4.
9. Hugh Thomas. The Story of Sandhurst, p.20.
10. Ibid, pp.28-32. (William Pitt, the Prime Minister acquired the land on which the new college was to be built and sold it soon afterwards to his own Government for a substantial profit - reckoned to be about L6,000).
11. RH Thoumine. Scientific Soldier - A Life of General Le Marchant 1766-1812, pp.43-48.
12. AR Godwin-Austen. The Staff and the Staff College, pp.15-16.
13. RH Thoumine. Scientific Soldier - A Life of General Le Marchant 1766-1812, pp.64-66.
14. AR Godwin-Austen. The Staff and the Staff College. pp.45-46. Brian Bond. The Army in Victorian Society, pp.11 and 22.
15. Ibid, p.14
16. Ibid, p.41.

CHAPTER 2

A TRAINING SCHEME "ARCHITECTS AND ARCHITECTURE"

(1799 - 1812)

The requirement for a training scheme for the officers of the Army had already been raised on a number of occasions prior to the period dealt with here but nothing very much had ever been achieved. As we have seen, the establishment of an academy for prospective officers of the Ordnance corps (the artillery and engineers) was accomplished in 1741 but the non-technical officers of the Guards and line regiments had no comparable institution of learning. This chapter traces the efforts of a few men of vision to win approval for a radical change in the Officer Corps. The life of the chief-architect of this revolutionary scheme, Lieutenant Colonel (later Major General) John Baspard Le Marchant, forms the basis for the discussion of his ideas from 1799 until his untimely death in 1812.

John Baspard Le Marchant was born in 1766, the son of a Guernseyman (the Channel Islands) who had fought as a subaltern during the Seven Years' War. His family had a moderate fortune and he was encouraged to join the Army at the age of sixteen when his father

purchased a commission for him in the York Militia. Details of the early part of his military career, including an unfortunate challenge delivered to his commanding officer (a friend of his father) shortly after joining the regiment, are recorded in detail elsewhere(1). The following brief outline is only intended to show how, by 1798, he came to be known at Court as an officer of remarkable vision.

By 1798 Le Marchant had served with the 1st Regiment of Foot (1783), the 6th (Inniskilling) Dragoons (1788), the 2nd Dragoon Guards (1789), the 16th Light Dragoons (1794), *Hompesch's* Hussars (a German Regiment in British pay with whom Le Marchant never actually served, he merely 'belonged to it' for a few weeks in May 1797), and the 7th Dragoons (by Royal patronage in 1797). He had seen active service as a regimental officer in Ireland, Gibraltar and Flanders and had also served as brigade-major to General Harcourt's cavalry brigade (later commanded by General Sir David Dundas who was to succeed as the Quartermaster-General in 1799 and then Commander-in-Chief in 1809) during the latter campaign. He was first noticed by the amiable King George III in 1789 when he commanded the King's escort on a journey from Dorchester to Weymouth. Shortly afterwards Sir George Yonge, the Secretary-at-War, met him and was so impressed by his water-colours of Gibraltar (he had had little to do in Gibraltar but paint) that he sent Le Marchant's sketch book to the King who very much admired it. While in Flanders he came to the attention of Colonel Count Hohenzollern who commended his squadron publicly for its discipline and courage during the battle of Cassel. He was a superb horseman, a conscientious soldier

and a very able artist. He was also a man of deep thought and it is perhaps the latter quality that made him such an extraordinarily effective reformer. Between 1796 - 1798 Le Marchant had perfected a series of new sword drills for the cavalry and had a manual of the exercises approved by Horse Guards and published. He had also redesigned the cavalry sabre and secured its approval(2), after rigorous tests, from the new Commander-in-Chief, the Duke of York. It was to be used by the cavalry without modification for the next twenty years. He followed his earlier publication with a detailed memorandum entitled *The Duty of Officers on the Outpost* which discussed the tactical handling of vedettes(3) and another on how to prevent fraud amongst those who were responsible for the provision of fodder for cavalry horses. His ability to write accurate and unambiguous prose also led to his being given the unenviable task of rewriting *Standing Orders for the Army*. Le Marchant became a familiar figure at Horse Guards. He had received the support of the King (who was personally responsible for his appointment to junior command of the 7th in 1797), and of the Commander-in-Chief, and his opinions on professional matters were sought by a wide section of high-ranking officers.

While he was with the 7th Dragoons, Le Marchant had lectured to all his officers three times a week on elementary tactics and offered further instruction to the junior subalterns in the performance of their daily administrative duties. The instruction gradually filtered down as the students became the teachers of their own men. In the summer of 1798 the Prince of Wales complimented Le Marchant by saying

that he wished his own regiment (the 10th Dragoons) was the equal of the 7th. His experience of service both at home and abroad, and the opposition he had faced in some quarters against the sword exercises, convinced him that the major obstacle to any reform within the Army would be found amongst the officers and not the soldiers who were usually willing to try new initiatives. While travelling alone to Guildford to rejoin his regiment in the Autumn of 1798 and pondering how to improve his regimental school for officers, he became firmly convinced that *"....nothing short of a national establishment, on a scale far more extensive than had yet been proposed, would be found to yield any solid or adequate advantage to the state..."*(4). He committed the outline of his plan for a training scheme to paper immediately and would often say later that, as he entered an inn that night to break his journey and begin writing, he felt a strange confidence that his design would ultimately be successful. However, as we have already seen, he cannot have been under any illusions as to the problems he would face from the military establishment. A brief glance at the outline timetable of important events in the development of the College at Appendix 2 will give the reader an indication of the difficult task he had set himself.

The British Land Force of 1799 was a two-headed organisation, with the Army giving allegiance to the reigning monarch while the other part, the Ordnance, answered directly to Parliament. To further confuse matters authority for the continued existence of the Army came from the Treasury, renewable on an annual basis under the parliamentary

law of the Mutiny Acts which had been designed to restrict the autonomy of the Crown and senior commanders. Maintenance of the Ordnance corps was by an entirely separate vote from Parliament and the Ordnance Board even had the authority, in an emergency, to expend monies that had not been approved. The overall administration of the Army in peace was in the hands of elected ministers and ministers and civil servants leaving the military officers entirely free to pursue professional interests. A similar situation exists today but the lines are more clearly defined now for two reasons: first the Ordnance was subsumed by the Army in 1855, which made for a single military command structure and second, the strong distinction which had existed between Crown and Parliament was gradually diluted during the reign of William IV (1830- 1837) as officers promised allegiance to *"....the King and his appointed ministers....."*(5), for the first time, thereby joining the Crown and the elected government together inextricably in the eyes of the military servants of the nation.

The Army was not popular at the end of the eighteenth century. The fiasco which was the Flanders Campaign had not impressed the civil population that had paid for the expedition; Admiral Lord Nelson had claimed all the favourable attention of the public after his Naval victories at Cape St Vincent and the Nile in 1798 had apparently saved the Country from invasion. The costs of maintaining an armed force in peacetime (even during periods of fragile peace) have always been contested and this was the essential reason for the unpreparedness of the Army at the outbreak of the war with France in 1793. The motto of

Fort Leavenworth ("Ad bellum pace parati" - prepared in peace for war) provides a good example of the importance that most military men feel should be placed on maintaining an effective contingency force during periods of low tension. Countless examples exist of nations failing to follow this advice. The diagram at Appendix 3(6) show the organisation of the military administration at the start of the nineteenth century and the notes describe the major changes that took place between 1854-1858. The Treasury was the hook upon which the existence of the Army hung; it authorised the money for maintenance during peace and paid the extra-ordinary sums required in the event of war. The Paymaster-General, a political officer, was responsible for the pay and allowances of officers and soldiers, while the Commisary-in-Chief, a Treasury official, paid the bills during a war as they occurred. The hub of the system in peacetime was the office of the Secretary-at-War; this was an ancient office which originated as the Crown's Private Secretary at the War Department. The Secretary-at-War approved rates of pay and the authorized strengths of the regiments. His power increased during the nineteenth century until the office was absorbed by the Secretary-of-State for War in 1855. The Secretary-of-State previously had relatively little power during periods of peace but in time of war would mobilize the entire military effort.

Horse Guards was the office of the Commander-in-Chief. It was staffed by the Adjutant-General and the Quartermaster-General who, between them, undertook all the duties of administration and organisation (these functions correspond today with the G1 and G4

branches of the Army staff). The Adjutant-General was the more senior and his tasks extended to the issuing of all orders on behalf of the Army commander during peace and war. In peacetime the Quartermaster-General must have despaired for something to do as his responsibility was restricted to laying out camps and organising troop-marches.

The last major department was the Board of Ordnance, a civil organisation headed by a distinguished officer who held a seat in Parliament. The history of the Board can be traced to medieval times and it had always been responsible for the supply of weapons and munitions. It was the scientific branch of the military and it organized, paid and maintained a force of its own. The Ordnance corps comprised the artillery, a body of officers called the Royal Engineers and their soldiers, the Royal Military Artificers. In 1799 the organisation was still fiercely independent from the Commander-in-Chief. The commanders of the two corps that comprised the Ordnance; the Deputy-Adjutant-General of the Royal Artillery, and the Inspector General of Fortifications promoted a family spirit to emphasize that they were members of an exclusive technical society. The officers were promoted by seniority and, to a lesser degree, on merit and earned commissions by attending the Corps' own military school, the Royal Military Academy Woolwich. The ranks were different from those in the Army and the pay was different; the two component parts of the military organisation were as distinct from each other then as the three separate services are today.

The Army of 1799 drilled incessantly. The drill of the parade ground was a necessary precursor to performing more complicated drills while on manoeuvres and it had the added advantage of providing a pleasant spectacle for the public and senior officers. It is quite certain that the regimental officers were all very well versed in performing drills, both on parade and in the field, but also that they lacked a clear understanding of military tactics. There might well have been confusion at the time about precisely what the difference was between the two - after all both involved manoeuvring bodies of troops. Le Marchant fully appreciated the difference and through the account of his life privately published by his son(7) it is clear that he was convinced that there was a need for the establishment of a uniform system of instruction which would embrace both the principles and practice of warfare in all of its branches. This is the important distinction between the two schools of thought: Le Marchant realised that drills formed the necessary training of an ordered, disciplined body of soldiers, be they cavalry or infantry, while tactics was the employment of all the troops together in manoeuvres which would ultimately achieve victory in battle. Napoleon had shown how army corps could be moved independent of each other yet be made to act in unison on the battlefield through careful planning. This was the substance of Le Marchant's view of tactics. He understood the urgency with which the art of war needed to be studied as improvements in road transport, communications, and infantry and artillery firepower towards the end of the seventeenth century led to easier dispersion of single, massed armies(8). It is a view very similar to the doctrine in US Army Field

Manual 100-5 which describes tactics as "...the application of combat power"(9) and to the modern dictionary definition of how to achieve victory in battle through the "science or art of manoeuvring in the presence of the enemy"(10). The art of war was becoming, paradoxically, a science for officers and Le Marchant believed it could be taught but not inherited. As General Jarry, that aged, intelligent and immensely experienced(11) first superintendent of the Senior Department, wrote in February 1800:

An officer who proposes to serve on the staff should be acquainted (already) with infantry and cavalry manoeuvres. It is not these manoeuvres that are taught at Wycombe, but the use and reason of them.(12)

Jarry and Le Marchant were not entirely alone in thinking that a full understanding of the systems of manoeuvre was essential to operational success on the battlefield. Napoleon had proved the mighty power of artillery, when it was used in concert with the infantry and cavalry, and had stressed the importance of organising forces in order to concentrate fire on a single point(13). The emergence of technology as a combat multiplier was still very much in its infancy but improvements in munitions and in the construction of defensive fortifications were to play a significant role during the Peninsular War. With hindsight it is obvious that a grounding in tactics was essential for commanders and their staff advisors but at the time it was yet another revolutionary thought which Jarry shared with as many people who would listen, and it can only be supposed that his students provided a satisfactory audience. Perhaps it was only arrogance that

made a need for qualifications other than nobility and some regimental experience in the Army seem ridiculous. However there was a genuine belief amongst many commentators of the time that it was much better for an officer to be a gentleman "....than for him to be a cad whose professionalise would be watched by his mercenary attitudes"(14). This opinion was held by soldiers as well. Rifleman Harris wrote the following during the Peninsular War:

I know from experience that in our Army the men like best to be officered by gentlemen, men whose education has rendered them more kind in manners than your coarse officer, sprung from obscure origins, and whose style is brutal and overbearing.(15)

Le Marchant had, by 1799, proved to himself that the Army was a scientific profession which deserved conscientious study. Britain was the only major European power without a military school of war; France had a school at St Cyr in Coetquidan, Frederick the Great's *Kriegsschule* had been in existence for nearly 25 years and the Tsar had established a school for cadets in St Petersburg. The failure of Britain to follow a similar course was due largely to the mistrust of militarism which was rooted in the national character(16). The British officer was seen as a civilian in uniform; a gentleman whose qualities lay in his personal courage and a natural habit of commanding authority. Thus there was a strong belief in the hereditary nature of leadership which even Napoleon's example could not quite upset. Some measure of the scale of opposition Le Marchant was to meet is illustrated by the following reply he received from the Commander-in-Chief to his draft proposal for the establishment of four departments of military education which was sent to the Duke in January 1799:

I have no wish to discourage you, yet I can hardly recommend you to sacrifice your time and talents to a project which seems so very unlikely to succeed. Nothing can be done so long as people think on the subject as they do now, and I despair of removing their prejudices, for prejudices they are, unless you can absolutely demonstrate them to be groundless. This cannot be done in a moment, and it will take stronger arguments than those you have laid before me. If you will revise your plan, and accompany it with all the details necessary for satisfying the public, it shall have my warm support.(17)

Within three months Le Marchant had presented a second paper which was so detailed, comprising not only the plan for the education and training of officers but also full financial statements to prove that his proposals were affordable, that he convinced the Duke of the value of the scheme. The three original departments and the Legion were to be organised under the collective management of a military college:

The First Department - this was to be a school for the general instruction of boys between the ages of 13 to 15. These boys would not necessarily enter the Army but those who did well would be encouraged to do so.

The Second Department - a military training establishment for those who had made satisfactory progress in the First Department and wished to earn commissions.

The "Legion" - a school for the sons of soldiers between the ages of 13 to 15 who, by their superior education, should provide a source of future NCOs.

The Third Department - a college for the education of officers with over four years service with the express aim of fitting them for staff appointments.(18)

It is worth noting that while Le Marchant was drawing up his plans, he had frequent and detailed discussions with the Duke, the Duke's private secretary and both the Adjutant and Quartermaster-generals. His thoughts were crystalized by thorough debate but he

admitted that there was".....much more to arrange than I had expected and as I go on the mind furnishes new ideas that clearly proves the impossibility of grasping a complete system at once....."(19). Unfortunately the restrictions of time and distance made it impossible to trace the original proposal that was set before the Duke but the immense amount of detail that went into it is attested to in his biography(20) and by Lieutenant General AR Godwin-Austen who quotes, as an example, an inventory of linen proposed by Le Marchant for the cadets of the Second Department:

3 shirts
3 pairs of stockings
3 pocket-handkerchiefs
1 pair of drawers
1 night cap
2 hand towels.

Another occurrence at this time was General Francis Jarry's arrival in England. As we have seen he had achieved a reputation as an experienced staff officer and was generally regarded as one of the foremost tacticians of the day(21). He acted as a catalyst for everything that Le Marchant was trying to achieve. Jarry was sponsored on his arrival in England in 1798 by two very influential politicians; Lord Auckland, whose daughter, Miss Amelia Eden, was of particular interest to the young bachelor Prime Minister, William Pitt, and the Duke of Portland who was the Home Secretary and was later to succeed Pitt as Prime Minister. Auckland introduced Jarry to the Secretary-of-State for War, Mr Henry Dundas (he was not related to General Dundas) in April 1798 and he had suggested the formation of a school for training officers - an English Kriegsschule. Jarry's own plan was a

small-scale version of Le Marchant's and therefore was more likely to succeed against the prejudice which has already been discussed. However, in the event, Jarry, despite having powerful supporters, did not possess the strength of purpose necessary to promote his ideas. He had been given permission, in December 1798, to give a series of lectures to regimental officers who were keen to join the staff but this could hardly be said to have been the start of the Staff College as the historian Hugh Thomas suggests(22); regiments had been giving informal instruction to their officers for years. It seems likely that the pressure for acceptance of Le Marchant's proposals might have proved insufficient had not Jarry and his friends leaned their weight to the plan. Whatever the reason, it is recorded(23) that the lack of opposition to the revised scheme was astonishing and the Duke of York ordered the opening of a school to instruct officers (the Third Department) with Le Marchant as Commandant and Jarry as the Director of Instruction. Le Marchant had agreed to join forces with Jarry for the reasons given in a letter:

By joining General Jarry I strengthen my own interest. We are both acting to the same point, and the Duke having accepted his plan (so confined) before I had mentioned mine, it left a degree of suspicion in Jarry's friends that I wanted to throw him out, and as he is strong at headquarters it is a politic measure to join with him.(24)

The Third Department opened in temporary accommodation in some rooms of the Antelope Inn, High Wycombe on 4th May 1799 - without the assistance of any instructors(25). Le Marchant was not impressed by the Inn which he described as: ".....an old place, not at all calculated

for the purpose, but it will do to begin this year." It is perhaps the very nature of temporary military accomodation that the Antelope Inn was to remain the home of the Senior Department for the next fourteen years. However twenty-six young officers turned up to begin the course and within two months the effectiveness of the general system had been demonstrated and the need for further expansion was being seriously discussed.

Le Marchant had managed to achieve, in a remarkably short time, what no one had managed before; namely to gain public recognition of the need for a formal military training scheme. Although the beginning, in the Antelope, was for only one of his four departments, and that was only adopted for a trial period, he looked to the future of the overall scheme with confidence. He had circulated a summary of his proposals for each of the departments to interested parties on the opening day of the Third Department. A faithful reproduction of this detailed letter appears in Le Marchant's privately published biography but its content is of such significance to this study that it is once again reproduced, less preface, appendices and the section pertaining to the *Legion*, at Appendix 4. The response which he received to the content of this resume of his scheme strongly supported his ideas and the Duke of York, now certain of unstinting support from some of the most distinguished political characters in the country, stepped forward and declared himself patron of the institution.

The Duke authorised Le Marchant to recruit an adequate teaching staff. He appointed three mathematics professors, the first of which

was the indomitable Isaac Dalby who became a legend of the College and served it faithfully until he retired in 1820, aged 76. Unfortunately, before he could do any more he was recalled for foreign service and when he returned to High Wycombe a few months later it was clear that without his energy nothing further had been accomplished. Despite this set-back, by October thirty-four officers had attended Jarry's course of instruction. However the rest of the proposal had still not been agreed and the incessant round of meetings and private discussions to gain support began again.

In the autumn of 1800 the Prime Minister appointed a military committee to look into the entire scheme and to report to the Prime Minister's office by the end of the year. There were several delays at this point because the politics of committees got in the way of speedy progress. It is a curious fact that the land proposed for the development of a suitable college building at Blackwater (later the estate would be known by the name of the smaller, but nicer-sounding, hamlet of Sandhurst) belonged to none other than the Prime Minister; and that he had owned it for only a few months. He had bought it for an undisclosed sum from his niece's husband - a young and rather impoverished army officer called John Tickell. This coincidence goes beyond the bounds of reason and whereas AR Godwin-Austen conspicuously fails to discuss the matter, presumably as a mark of respect for "Honest" Pitt(26), Hugh Thomas gives a full account of the whole affair. The matter is referred to here because it brings to light more clearly than any other single incident, how complex and full of intrigues the business of preferment and patronage was.

The outcome of Pitt's involvement was the acceptance of a recommendation to establish a military institution, along the lines of that described by Le Marchant, under the authority of a Royal Warrant and to spend L146,000 on suitable buildings for the Institution. The Prime Minister, who by this time was the outright owner the site, sold it to the State for a profit of about L6,000(27). The Committee had also, at the same time, rejected the idea of forming the Legion, the school for the sons of non-commissioned officers, as it was thought it might lead to too frequent promotions from the ranks. It is by no means certain that Le Marchant ever saw the successful adoption of the Legion as more than a slim chance and it is possible that he included it knowing that it would be rejected; thereby giving the other departments a better chance of acceptance. There is some evidence for this. In his description of the scheme he makes it obvious, by its title, that the Legion is merely an arm of the training scheme and by not affording it a department number he makes it an easy target for any individual who wished to oppose the plan. The Duke of York must have seen more in the original idea than his committee members, and perhaps even Le Marchant, because the foundation stone of the Duke of York's Military School for the sons of serving soldiers (then called the Royal Military Asylum) was laid by him on 19 June 1801; as Godwin-Austen says: "*Le Marchant's idea was put into practise elsewhere*". Five days later, on 24 June, a Royal Warrant was published establishing the Royal Military College. Le Marchant engaged four more members of staff: one to teach German, one to instruct in the design and use of fortifications and two to teach military drawing (including mapping). On the 9th December a second

Royal Warrant confirmed the appointments of the staff and detailed the administrative arrangements of what was to be known from that date as the Senior Department of the College.

Three appointments were made immediately: the Governor was to be Lieutenant General Sir William Harcourt (Le Marchant's old cavalry brigade commander from the Flanders Campaign), with Le Marchant as Lieutenant-Governor and Superintendent-General and General Jarry as the Inspector-General of Instruction. A full Board of Commissioners was also set up to control the affairs of the Department(28) and some guidelines for entrance to the establishment were laid down. Officers attending the course of instruction had to be at least nineteen years old, to have already completed two years service and to be experienced in the discipline and interior economy of a troop or company. Academic requirements were restricted to understanding French (remember Jarry's lectures were all delivered in his own tongue) and the first four rules of arithmetic. Lastly, an annual fee of thirty guineas was charged to the students who were to attend the two-year course.

The Committee's report continued to be discussed and Le Marchant began to wonder if anything further would be achieved. At last he had some luck; General Sir Ralph Abercrombie was to lead an expedition to Egypt to evict the French from Alexandria and other coastal towns and Le Marchant was given authority to attach three *Nycozobites* to the General's staff. His choice of officers could hardly have been better. The efforts of majors Birch, Coffin and Leighton were commended and widely reported(29). Their success seems to have caused a change in the

public opinion of the College and suddenly it was seen as an essential part of the military training effort. On the 4th May 1802 another Royal Warrant set up the Junior Department of the College in temporary accomodation in Great Marlow (only a few miles from High Wycombe) until the estate at Sandhurst could be completed. This was almost a distillation of Le Marchant's First and Second departments as it would instruct "...those who, from early life, were intended for the military profession..."(see Appendix 4 - The First and Second departments) and those who successfully completed the course would be entitled to receive their commissions without purchase(30). The age limits fitted Le Marchant's original plan as well; entry to the Junior Department was to be between the ages of thirteen and fifteen years and the students would pass-out at the age of seventeen. Fees were set at fifty guineas per year although the sons of officers who had been killed in action were to be educated free of any charges. Once again the academic standard for entry does not seem very severe today: cadets had to understand the first four rules of arithmetic and to have studied the Latin grammar to the extent of the declension of nouns and the conjugation of verbs.

By the end of 1802 both the departments were functioning; the Senior Department, which was not restricted to a maximum number of students but in practice could not cope with more than fifteen per year, was instructing thirty officers and the Junior Department had accepted forty two cadets. The scheme was not quite as extensive as Le Marchant had proposed but it was a considerable achievement by any standards of

the day. The prejudices spoken of by the Duke of York had been eroded and the idea of training officers to command and teaching them the art and science of their profession was no longer an impossible idea.

Le Marchant was undoubtedly the chief architect of the scheme. It was his foresight and unstinting effort which eventually achieved the result. However it would be wrong to dismiss the enthusiasm of others who supported the scheme, suggested amendments and counselled caution and political expedience. These supporters were too numerous to record and some were certainly involved only for what they could get but the King, the Duke of York, Messrs Pitt and Dundas, the Duke of Portland, Lord Auckland, General Dundas and, of course, General Jarry merit attention for their part in the fight to earn recognition for the scheme. There were several difficulties during the succeeding years between 1802 - 1812. There was even a scandal involving public criticism of the Governor of the College, General Sir William Harcourt, for his ineptitude - which was probably deserved. The Senior and Junior departments each had a skeleton staff to conduct daily business and the individual personalities did not always get along well. RH Thoumine gives a detailed account of the various events in his book(31), which have little relevance to this study. The building at Sandhurst and the purchase of more land to expand the estate will not be discussed. Suffice to say that there were many problems associated with the area (it was an undeveloped area with few amenities and even fewer skilled craftsmen), the designs for the college and with the provision of adequate funds to keep the building going. On 16th August 1806 General

Jarry tendered his resignation. He was a tired old man who died six months later. He was mourned by Le Marchant who made the following entry in the College records: "...Jarry died at 2 am retaining his faculties to the last...The Country was never fully aware of his abilities nor did we make the most of them." It was Jarry who had insisted that the only way to improve the Army was by teaching tactics and the need for co-ordinated logistic support. In order to avoid sending soldiers unprepared into battle he taught reconnaissance, the use of ground and the importance of military sketching. He also instructed his students in the preparation of marching tables and the movement of supporting elements. Perhaps his most famous pupil was Lieutenant Colonel George Murray (later Wellington's Quartermaster-General) who had volunteered to attend the course in 1802 but had left after only five months to take a staff appointment. Hugh Thomas asserts that during the Peninsular War only one member of the Quartermaster-General's staff had not passed through the Senior Department(32). This is certainly an exaggeration - Sir Sidney Herbert, Secretary-at-War from 1846 and parliamentary military reformer, was probably closer to the truth when he said:

During the last five years of the Peninsular War I believe there was but one officer on the staff of the Quartermaster-General who had not passed through our staff school at High Wycombe.(33)

Things were going well. By 1806 there were three hundred cadets at the Junior Department but building at Sandhurst had come to a standstill, Major Howard Douglas had replaced Jarry quite effectively at High Wycombe and that course too was running to capacity. At the same time the Treasury was trying to reduce expenditure because the

cost of the war with France was rising but by 1808 it had agreed to order a re-start to the project at Sandhurst. Even the major scandal involving the Duke of York and his erstwhile mistress, Mary Anne Clark, in the sale of commissions had little effect on the College (although the students and staff all supported the Duke). The Duke resigned before the trial, alleging corruption, was over (he was found not guilty) and his place was taken by another strong supporter of the scheme, Sir David Dundas. Le Marchant continued to be inventive, even audacious, in his recommendations for reforms. He was asked to advise on the establishment or improvement of a number of military schools including; the East India Company's at Addiscombe, the Tsar's Cadet School in St Petersburg and a Spanish military school in Majorca. In the Summer of 1811 Le Marchant was promoted to major-general and one week later he received his orders to take command of a cavalry brigade for immediate service in Portugal. Two hundred officers had passed through the Senior Department by this date and one thousand five hundred cadets had been commissioned from the Junior Department. The applications to enter both departments were significantly more than the number of vacancies available and the whole scheme for training officers could be voted a success(34). It took ten years to finally complete the college building at Sandhurst and Le Marchant never saw it finished - he was killed, leading a magnificent cavalry charge at the Battle of Salamanca, on 22 July 1812, in which his Brigade of heavy cavalry destroyed the better part of three French divisions. The Duke of Wellington had great respect for Le Marchant's skill, intelligence and his iron command of troops and mourned his loss as possibly the most serious casualty of the War(35).

CHAPTER 2 - ENDNOTES

1. Denis Le Marchant. Memoirs of General Le Marchant; and RH Thoumine. Scientific Soldier, A Life of General Le Marchant 1766-1812.
2. RH Thoumine. Scientific Soldier, A Life of General Le Marchant 1766-1812, p.43.
3. *ibid.* p.54.
4. Denis Le Marchant. Memoirs of General Le Marchant, p.64.
5. The Queen's Regulations for The Army 1975 (Army Code 13206), Para.J1.001. *The government and command of each of the fighting services is vested in Her Majesty the Queen who has charged the Secretary of State with general responsibility for the defence of the Realm and established a Defence Council having command over the armed forces.*
6. SGP Ward. Wellington's Headquarters 1809-1814, p.7(diagram of organisation).
7. Denis Le Marchant. Memoirs of General Le Marchant, p.62.
8. Brian Bond. The Victorian Army and the Staff College, p.32.
9. Department of the Army of the United States of America. FM 100-5, p.10.
10. Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary, edited by AM Macdonald.
11. Hugh Thomas. The Story of Sandhurst, p.22. (Thomas sows a single seed of doubt regarding Jarry's pedigree by recording that there is no account of him in the otherwise meticulous files of the Prussian Foreign Ministry. No other source refers to this anomaly and the author is prepared to accept the majority verdict - that Jarry was all he said he was).
12. AR Bodwin-Austen. The Staff and the Staff College, p.35.
13. David B Chandler. The Military Maxims of Napoleon, p.15.
14. Gwyn Harries-Jenkins. The Army in Victorian Society, p.15.
15. *ibid.* p.16.(a quote from The Recollections of Rifleman Harris; edited by M Curling, London 1948; reprinted J McGuffie. Rank and File, London 1964, p.145).

16. RH Thoumine. Scientific Soldier, A Life of General Le Marchant 1766-1812, p.62.
17. Denis Le Marchant. Memoirs of General Le Marchant, p.65.
18. AR Godwin-Austen. The Staff and the Staff College, pp.15-16. (There is a difference between Godwin-Austen's interpretation of the departmental organisation and that quoted by RH Thoumine in The Scientific Soldier, p.64. A reference to Appendix 5 will leave the reader in no doubt that Godwin-Austen has got it right).
19. RH Thoumine. Scientific Soldier, A Life of General Le Marchant 1766-1812, p.63.
20. Denis Le Marchant. Memoirs of General Le Marchant.
21. AR Godwin-Austen. The Staff and the Staff College, p.14.
22. Hugh Thomas. The Story of Sandhurst, p.23.
23. RH Thoumine. Scientific Soldier, A Life of General Le Marchant 1766-1812, p.68.
24. AR Godwin-Austen. The Staff and the Staff College, p.16.
25. Denis Le Marchant. Memoirs of General Le Marchant, p.68.
26. *Honest* was the nickname given to William Pitt when he had been Minister of Finance and had abolished smuggling.
27. Hugh Thomas. The Story of Sandhurst, p.30.
28. AR Godwin-Austen. The Staff and the Staff College, p.20.
29. RH Thoumine. Scientific Soldier, A Life of General Le Marchant 1766-1812, p.79 and Denis Le Marchant. Memoirs of General Le Marchant, p.101.
30. Hugh Thomas. The Story of Sandhurst, pp.34-35.
31. RH Thoumine. Scientific Soldier, A Life of General Le Marchant 1766-1812.
32. Hugh Thomas. The Story of Sandhurst, p.39.
33. Brian Bond. The Victorian Army and the Staff College, p.52.
34. *ibid.* p.57.
35. Jac Weller. Wellington in the Peninsular 1808-1814, p.220.

CHAPTER 3

THE ROYAL MILITARY COLLEGE

"AIMS, STAFF, STUDENTS AND CURRICULUM"

THE TURBULENT YEARS

(1801 - 1858)

The Staff College and the Royal Military Academy are now, respectively, one hundred and ninety-one years and one hundred and eighty-eight years old. The education of officers and those destined to be officers was, as we have already seen, something of a novelty at the end of the eighteenth century. Le Marchant had overcome almost insuperable problems to gain approval of his ideas. It is necessary now to study the aims of the College and its raw material, the staff and students. From this it should be possible to draw some conclusions about the ultimate success of the enterprise and learn some lessons from the problems encountered in the early years of its history.

PERIOD OF INNOVATION (1801 - 1821)

Once the status of the College had been confirmed by Royal Warrant, Le Marchant turned his attention to the numerous administrative duties of his new office; that of Lieutenant-Governor of the establishment. Within a few months the military staff and civilian

lecturers, which he had recommended as essential to run the courses, were all recruited and in-post and the student intakes were filled. The summer months of 1802 were busy for both departments as the College was fully active for the first time. However it soon became clear that the rush for student places at the Senior Department was a rather misleading affirmation of its popularity as a place of learning. Le Marchant discovered that more students were impressed by the proximity of the College to London than by the chance of broadening their professional horizons - some had apparently only volunteered to attend the course to avoid onerous regimental duties.(1) The idle and ignorant were not tolerated however; Le Marchant wrote: "...there is no room in the College for even a single drone.." (2) and a number of officers found themselves recalled to their regiments for failing to take their studies seriously. On the other hand, those who wanted to learn were encouraged at every opportunity to work for their own advancement and also to promote the name of the College:

By....retaining those in whom he (Le Marchant) discovered (in concert with General Jarry) a wish and ability to improve themselves, and in whom he could place confidence, he established the firm foundation of an establishment which has proved of so much real benefit to the Army.(3)

The Government gave Le Marchant considerable powers of patronage regarding the recommendation of officers for service with the Quartermaster-General's Department and it is worth noting that he carried out this responsibility with no thought to friendship or connections. Within the Junior Department, which he visited in Marlow at

least twice each week, he must have appeared as an imposing character: *"The severe expression of his features, combined with the dignity of his manner and the deep tones of his voice, struck his youthful audience with an awe..."*(4). His integrity and great strength of character was a lesson to his students and, by his example, the cadets and student officers learned that to earn the respect of one's subordinates and peers was more important than merely being popular. That he was successful in impressing these young men is proved by the content of a letter sent to his son, shortly after his death, by an officer who had been to Marlow:

...although I feel I am not entitled to it (a portrait of Le Marchant), not having ever had the good fortune to have been under his orders: yet, should it find no more worthy destination, I shall accept, and keep it, with the sentiments that everyone must have, who had, however slightly, known such a man.(5)

Having discussed the character of the man who was, in all but name, the commander of the entire establishment, it is worth looking briefly at his duties as the Lieutenant-Governor. His main responsibility was the overall management of the College; a sort of school bursar. He was meticulous in keeping the accounts because he had calculated, in his proposal, the annual running costs of the establishment to prove the project was financially viable and he was aware of the importance attached to this aspect by the Government(6). His position was subordinate to the Governor, General Lord Harcourt, who was dilatory, unbusinesslike and nearly always absent from the College - he did not live in the area, as he was required to by the College

statutes, because he could not find a suitable house. Consequently Le Marchant was in the unenviable position of bearing the responsibility of running the establishment without having an executive authority at hand to make decisions. The correspondence which resulted from Harcourt's absenteeism, added to his other official letters written during the nine years he held his command, fill five enormous folios(7) and were later to prove his salvation from a vindictive charge of calumny by Harcourt.

Each department was originally allotted a commandant but a suitable officer was not found to command the Senior Department until 1804 when Major (later General) Sir Howard Douglas joined the staff. When General Jarry retired In 1806 Douglas managed to combine the duties of Commandant with those of Superintendent-General of Instruction. Until 1804, then, the gap was filled by Le Marchant, reducing the amount of time he had to spend with the Junior Department. This was unfortunate because the officer selected to command at Marlow was a most unsuitable choice and the impact that he had on the Junior Department was marked. Lieutenant Colonel Butler was an artillery officer. Ten years Le Marchant's senior, he had never seen active service and had not commanded troops for over twenty years. Opinions regarding the relationship between the two men vary. Hugh Thomas describes Butler as; "an amiable, easy-going snob, closer to Harcourt than to Le Marchant", Godwin-Austen says; "...the Commandant of was his (Le Marchant's) friend Colonel Butler", but Thoumine describes the relationship in detail(8) and states "...from the outset feud and fire existed between the Lieutenant-Governor and the Commandant of the junior school,

Lieutenant Colonel Butler". The comments of Thomas and Godwin-Austen are curious because the evidence cited by Thoumine is overwhelming and the Author is convinced that the latter assessment of their relationship is correct. Le Marchant was constantly troubled by the lax discipline at Marlow but was prevented from acting by General Harcourt who gave greater autonomy to Butler than the statutes of the College allowed. Le Marchant kept up a steady stream of letters in an attempt to convince the Governor that the Junior Department was in decline but his warnings always went unheeded. Eventually, in December 1806, Le Marchant asked Harcourt to look into a list of irregularities which he had observed at Marlow including fraud by tradesmen and appalling behaviour of some cadets and was amazed to find himself charged with calumny and required to substantiate the charges he had made. The inquiry began on 23 January 1807 and Le Marchant produced copies of all the letters he had sent to the Governor and Butler since 1804 (he later described these letters as "*...the written documents that preserved me from total ruin*") in which he cited incidents, times, dates and the names of witnesses. The inquiry exonerated Le Marchant and surprisingly, relations between the three men improved substantially; a lot of the freedom that Butler had once enjoyed was removed and the Lieutenant-Governor resumed his authoritative position.

The foregoing paragraph shows that things did not always run smoothly during the early years. It is important that the reader is made aware of the constant friction that existed, because it is this that generated the need for the apparently never-ending series of changes

which took place during the period studied in this thesis. Having passed the revolutionary period of the establishment of the College, we now enter the evolutionary stage of its development. The remainder of this chapter will be concerned with the organisation and rules of the College rather than with the personalities who devised and enforced them.

A Supreme Board had been established in 1802 to arrange and manage the affairs of the College once it had been confirmed by Royal Warrant. The Board was probably the most senior that had ever been composed: of the eleven members, three were required to form a quorum of whom one had to be either the Commander-in-Chief, the Adjutant-General, or the Quartermaster-General. The remaining members were: the Secretary-at-war, the Master-General of the Ordnance, the Barrackmaster-General, the Governor of the College, the Lieutenant-Governor, General Sir William Fancett, Lieutenant General the Earl of Harrington and General Lord Cathcart. In January 1802 this august body agreed finally on the stated objects of the Senior Department:

To instruct commissioned officers, who have served a specified number of years with their regiments, in the scientific parts of their profession, in view of enabling them the better to discharge their duties when acting in command of their regiments, and of qualifying them for employment in the Quartermaster-General's and Adjutant-General's departments.(9)

The number of students was not limited by statute. However the accommodation was a restricting factor and the average number of officers undergoing instruction was about twenty-five(10). There was no entrance requirement other than those discussed in Chapter 2. The selection of

officers was once again a matter of influence and patronage. During the first few years the lessons of instruction were laid down by Jarry and Le Marchant. French, German, mathematics, astronomy and fortifications were taught and there was also a comprehensive list of tactical and technical subjects; Jarry's *Instructions*, which covered all reconnaissance work, schemes (plans and tactics) and staff-duties.

Jarry described the content of these lectures in suffocating detail. The original, with an English translation, was published in The British Military Library Volume II dated February 1800(11). It is sufficient to record here that no one was ever known to have read it in full and King George III, for whom anything connected with the College was of consuming interest, only managed the rather tepid comment that it was "most interesting". Godwin-Austen is more amusing when he describes the Adjutant-General's reaction to the work as the sort of non-committal remark that might be made by a member of the teaching staff on a truly uninspiring paper: "...you have taken a great deal of trouble over this." Despite these criticisms there is no doubt that the lectures themselves were of a very high standard and formed the basis of the Army's tactical training for more than fifty years.

Jarry placed great emphasis upon the application of basic military principles to the ground. He pointed out that a commander could never formulate a plan until he had a clear picture of the ground on which to base his tactical manoeuvres. He was adamant that every commander must have a staff which would produce this vital information

in the form of maps and sketches. The lack of a definitive series of maps at the time made this doubly important and Jarry continued by arguing the importance of timely information and therefore the need of a number of sketchers working simultaneously. He concludes his lengthy remarks on reconnaissance by saying:

It is this formed practice of promptly obtaining a reconnaissance of the whole of a large piece of ground which is taught at Wycombe, as a means of facilitating, clarifying and fixing the disposition of generals. (12)

The students spent a large part of their time in practising the art of sketching and it is fortunate that many original examples of the students' efforts remain in the Sandhurst Collection. Jarry believed that a sketch was superior to the written report. The following comment which is attributed to him might have averted the disastrous charge of the Light Brigade fifty-five years later had Lord Raglan heeded the advice:

Everything which is put down in writing of necessity takes on some colour from the opinion of the writer. A sketch-map allows of no opinion; it is the ground and nothing more. (13)

Other military subjects under Jarry's control included castrametation (the science of siting, construction and the defence of camps), protection on the move, marches, manoeuvre and the importance of all-arms co-operation. In addition to Jarry's lecture notes, Le Marchant's papers include a detailed summary of what was expected of an Assistant Quartermaster-General at the divisional level (14) and we may take it that this formed the basis for more detailed instruction. The

duties were comprehensive and covered everything that was not specifically delegated to the Adjutant-General's Department. In short they combined what we now refer to as the G3 and G4 branches. All the classroom teaching was put into practice during outdoor exercises which were carefully prepared and possible solutions to the various problems were available to the Directing-Staff for their de-briefs.

This then was the organisation and teaching of the Senior Department during the first few years of its life at the Antelope Inn, High Wycombe. It has already been made clear that the accommodation was not ideally suited but as things settled down a higher standard of education was achieved. A passing-out examination was introduced in March 1805 and successful graduates were recognised by the post-nominal letters MCC (the Military College Certificate). The Supreme Board conducted the exam which had both written and oral sections. The students were worked hard during the two-year course; daily hours were from nine o'clock until four o'clock with no half days and the statutes laid down that, "...no officer should apply for leave except in cases of the most urgent necessity; of which sufficient proofs will be required." It is also worth repeating that the officers were required to pay for the course (30 guineas each year) if they wished to retain their regimental rank, pay and privileges. In 1808 a further Royal Warrant laid down some new regulations. The age limit for students was raised to twenty-one and a minimum of three years' service abroad or four at home was required instead of two. A further clause was of much greater significance; it re-stated the purpose, or aim, of the College in the

same terms that had been used in 1802, thereby laying two distinct and separate duties upon the Department; to train future commanders as well as staff officers. This is a very significant point because it lays a foundation of training which does not divorce the staff from the chain of command. The aim of the Staff College today is very similar:

...to develop the professional knowledge and understanding of selected officers, in order to prepare them for the assumption of increased responsibility both on the staff and in command...(from the Charter of the Staff College)

The Warrant also confirmed new terms of employment for the members of staff including pay, pensions and the number of civilians and military who could be employed. The whole enterprise had, by this stage proved itself to the Commissioners of the Supreme Board, the Government and to the public. The war with France might well have been responsible for much of the enthusiasm generated about the College at the time but whatever the reason, the institution had made its mark and was guaranteed continued support.

The students studied the science rather than the art of warfare and some of them must have made a strange impression on their less well educated fellows when they returned to their regiments. Hopefully few were quite as insufferable in their new knowledge as one officer who, landing at Copenhagen to join the war, asked the way from some hard-pressed artillerymen who were constructing a battery and remarked: "I perceive sir that you are constructing an epaulement; let it be a special observance of yours to make your base equal to your

perpendicular."(15) - One wonders how long he can have survived in the presence of soldiers. Fortunately most *Wycombe*s were more resourceful than they were bookish and Wellington's Quartermaster-General, Colonel George Murray, made best use of the college-trained officers he was sent during the five years of the Peninsular War.

In 1810 the Commissioners of Military Inquiry inspected the College as a whole and in their Tenth Report they confirmed that the establishment was well run along suitably economic lines. The cost for 1809 had been £5,400 and on the credit side there was an income from the students' fees of £1,600. The Report finished with a recommendation that additional funds should be set aside to build extra accommodation for the Senior Department at Sandhurst where the buildings for the Junior Department were to be. The following year an article appeared in the June edition of the Royal Military Chronicle which gave an assessment of the value of Le Marchant's institutions:

Marlow and Wycombe are rapidly effecting a change...not only by the numerous accomplished officers they produce, but the desire of knowledge which has thereby been disseminated through the Army. Officers, even of the rank of lieutenant colonel, feeling the deficiency of their first education, return to school to make themselves masters of subjects which greatly increase their value and importance and open for them a shorter and more splendid road to preferment and distinction.(16)

The Department moved in 1813 to a house in Farnham which it occupied until it was moved again, in 1821, to join the Junior Department at Sandhurst. The years at Farnham were unremarkable. After Wellington's victory in the Peninsular a number of quite senior officers

joined the ranks of students in order to learn the detail of the lessons that had proved invaluable on active service. Amongst these was Lieutenant Colonel Charles Napier who joined the course in 1817 and must have been an awkward, prejudiced, student. He had already severely criticised the scheme in an essay about French officers which was published in 1810:

Their staff are selected for talents and experience; not for their youth, ignorance and imbecility, as in our Army - displayed in vanity, impertinence, and blunders on all occasions. A French quartermaster-general is not distinguished by his dangling sabretache, High Wycombe drawing-book and fine asse's skin and asse's head, with which he makes rapid sketches equally deficient in clearness and accuracy.(17)

The staff was reduced from seven professors to five between 1815 - 1820 but the main economies were to result from the move to Sandhurst in 1821 when the staff was reduced to two professors and the students to fifteen. At this junct a new regulations came into force and the fortunes of the Senior Department waned. All applicants for a place on the course, which was reduced to one year so the throughput of officers remained the same, were required to pass an entrance examination. The subjects tested were: arithmetic, geometry, military drawing and french grammar. The course content was also changed and far greater emphasis was placed upon the purely academic subjects - to the detriment of the instruction in tactics, military history and strategy which were conspicuously absent from the revised syllabus. It is also interesting that no mention was made of instruction in staff-duties or administration. Godwin-Austen suggests(18) that the word "scientific",

as used in the Royal Warrant of 1808 had become misconstrued and the focus of education shifted away from "military science" to "general science". The new curriculum embraced: mathematics, surveying, military drawing, astronomy, fortifications, german and french. Of course, by this time most applicants had already been through the Junior Department where a firm grounding in these more academic subjects had been made. At this point it is worth directing attention toward the lower school at Marlow, which was moved to its new accomodation at Sandhurst in 1812, to see how it was being developed.

We have seen that the absence of the Governor, Lord Harcourt, and the animosity which existed between Le Marchant and Colonel Butler led to some awkward problems of administration. Le Marchant was effectively confined to running the Senior Department until the confrontation of 1807 restored some of his authority over Butler at Marlow. When the Department opened on 17 May 1802 sixteen 'gentlemen cadets' joined. By the end of that year forty-two cadets had been accepted of which five were destined for the Indian Army. These youths were all aged between thirteen and fifteen, as the statutes required, and they were entitled to receive their commissions without purchase at the age of seventeen. The building of new accomodation on the land purchased at Blackwater (later Sandhurst) from William Pitt, Esq., proceeded at an amazingly slow pace, due in large part to the vacillation of the Treasury which complained constantly about the cost of the war against France. The official reasons for selecting the site give some bearing on the aims of the department:

1. The uncircumscribed extent of land (600 acres), which admits of the buildings being so placed as to avoid a neighbourhood injurious to the morals of the cadets, and which allows space also for military movements, and the construction of military works without interruption.

2. The opportunity afforded of military instruction from large encampments of troops (author's note - Le Marchant's original plan included the *Legion* for just this purpose), which .. are generally situated in the vicinity of Bagshot; and, lastly, the low price of land (author's note - this clause clears Mr Pitt, in advance, from any accusations of profiteering, see page 28) with the vicinity of water-carriage by the Basingstoke Canal.(19)

We will not be concerned with the details of the construction except to say that it gave Le Marchant a great deal of trouble and was not finally ready for occupation until 1813; a detailed account is presented by Peter Shepperd in his book *Sandhurst*(20).

The aim of the Junior Department was to prepare young men for future service in the Army by setting a proper standard of achievement for young officers prior to their commissioning. It offered the education that Le Marchant had recommended in his proposal for the first and second departments of the training scheme; based firmly on an understanding of science, the rudiments of military drill and fencing and riding skills. At the outset it was clearly the junior department in more than one sense. Whereas majors Birch, Coffin and Leighton had earned considerable support for the Senior Department during their spell on Sir Ralph Abercrombie's staff in Egypt in 1800, their junior counterparts would be of limited use and little interest for several years. However when the war with France re-opened in May 1803 there was

an increased urgency to recruit, train and commission young officers for the Army and the Ordnance corps.

In 1803 the number of cadets was increased to four hundred, although this figure was not reached for several years. In order to save on costs a complicated scale of fees was established(21) which must have made it very difficult for the college staff to keep track of income and expenditure. One hundred orphaned sons of officers killed in action were to be educated free, eighty sons of serving officers would pay an annual fee of L40 each year and one-hundred noblemen's sons would be charged L90 each year. In addition to these entrants, up to sixty cadets destined for the Royal Artillery, who would transfer to Woolwich as space there became available, and sixty who were for the East India Company would pay L90 each year. Accommodation was in short supply and another house was taken in Marlow to house the expected invasion. The Department was reorganised into four companies, each commanded by a captain. The daily routine began at five o'clock and was a mix of classroom academic studies, drill, inspections, riding, fencing, swimming and military studies, lights-out was at ten o'clock. The regimen was quite harsh but probably no more so than that at most public schools in England at the time. The conditions under which the cadets entered the Department were quite straight-forward and the chance to receive a commission, without purchase, in the cavalry and infantry regiments was real. However the reader should not think that this was the beginning of the end of patronage and the purchase system. The latter was to survive for another seventy years and the former has

probably never been eroded completely. Most of the cadets from noble families would continue to buy their promotions and very few of those who could not afford to purchase their commissions would be accepted in the cavalry. The only figures available from the research material which emphasise this point come from the period 1834-1838(22) but it is reasonable to suppose that things had not changed very much from the earliest days of the Junior Department:

First Commissions Granted in the Army: 1834 - 1838

<u>Regiment</u>	<u>Commission by Purchase</u>	<u>Commission by Non-Purchase</u>	<u>Total</u>
Cavalry	221	6	227
Guards	34	8	42
Line	859	246	1105
Total	1114	260	1374
From the Ranks	3	33	36
Total	1117	293	1410

There were occasional disturbances when the cadets, or at least some of them, got out-of-hand and there was at least one planned mutiny, on 19th August 1804, when ten (one later turned informer on his comrades) cadets hoped to force the dismissal of a company commander and the Chaplain, obtain a promise of shorter working hours and the abolition of punishment by confinement in the *Black Hole*. Resources differ as to the main target for this outrage - whether it was the strict regimen or the Commandant, Colonel Butler. But all are clear on two counts; that the cadets would only discuss their grievances with Le Marchant and that the punishment of the offenders, ordered by the

Governor, was very severe(23) - they were dismissed with ignominy. The main cause for complaint, though, remained the lack of adequate accomodation. Le Marchant made the point clearly in a letter to the Adjutant-General, General Sir Henry Calvert, during March 1805:

...Growing boys require a degree of care, warmth and nourishment that they procure in their homes, but which it is impossible to afford them during the winter at the College. At present, and in temporary buildings, the means we have is very inefficient. The proportion of sick is considerable, arising from wet feet and want of individual comfort....I am sorry to say there are now six cadets in the infirmary with venereal complaints. Nothing can show more clearly the necessity of proper accomodation.(24)

The rebellious spirit of the cadets was not crushed by the severity of the sentences given to the mutineers and discipline at Marlow went into a sharp decline. This eventually resulted in the charge of caluany against Le Marchant, which was described earlier, when he complained about a number of irregularities to the Supreme Board over Colonel Butler's head. The academic staff were no happier at Marlow and complained unceasingly about their paltry salaries, unsocial hours of work and the unruly cadets. By 1806 there were three-hundred cadets at Marlow and the fourth company was being formed. It is interesting to note that a new Academy building had been completed at Woolwich in 1806 in order to house the increased cadet population of the Ordnance corps but it proved insufficient. The new accomodation could only cope with the senior class cadets (about one-hundred and thirty) leaving the remaining one-hundred and eighty to be split between the old barracks in the Royal Arsenal and Marlow. Finally, in 1808, the Treasury agreed to allow work to begin on the new buildings at Sandhurst. The decision had

little to do with the appalling conditions at Marlow but was more concerned with getting some return from the original investment in the land and in saving the considerable sums paid in rent at Marlow. The East India Company opened its own military college at Addiscombe in 1810 which took some of the pressure off the other establishments and allowed them to concentrate their efforts on their respective charges - cadets for the Army and for the Ordnance. There is a good example at this time of discipline being good for the soul, if not the body. A young cadet, Sir Thomas Style, was expelled by Butler for encouraging other cadets to refuse to parade. Both the Adjutant-General and the new Commander-in-Chief, Sir David Dundas, censured the individual but allowed that if, after a period of two years, a general officer would recommend him as a reformed character, he could still be commissioned. The general officer duly came forward, Style was commissioned, sent to the Peninsular immediately and shortly afterwards he died a hero's death(25).

The cadets began the move to the new building at Sandhurst during the winter months of 1812. Apparently Horse Guards had become anxious that the Prince Regent, who had visited the grounds, wanted the site for a new palace; the prospect of second Brighton Pavillion was presumably too much for their conservative tastes the cadets were moved before the building was completed. At the same time the Senior Department left High Wycombe for Farnham where it would remain a further eight years before its own apartments at Sandhurst were complete. The original estimate of the building costs was £146,000 but by 1813 the

bills amounted to about L365,000(26). The grounds were in the process of being landscaped and the main building included houses for the paymaster and the surgeon. The old manor house had been completely refurbished and thirteen double-houses had been built for the professors (because of their shape this line of houses has always been known as *tea-caddy row*).

The war in the Peninsular was demanding more and more officers and even those cadets who, at the age of seventeen, were not considered suitable for commissioning could get leave to join Wellington's Army as volunteers with the rank of ensign. Twenty officers from the Junior Department other than Le Marchant died in the Peninsular and a further twelve fell at Waterloo. The war-conscious Government was happy to pay for facilities which might improve the education of the cadets and the annual estimate of expenses rose to between L30,000 - L40,000. The annual qualifying examination was also revised and came more in line with the level of education expected of an officer who wished to enter the Senior Department. This exam had to be taken by cadets before they were eighteen if they were to be commissioned without purchase - it was comprehensive and covered Vauban's systems of fortification(27) and military drawing, as well as requiring a detailed knowledge of the first six of Euclid's nine books on geometry, a sound basis in history and a clear understanding of French or German grammar. This fitted the requirements of the Senior Department's new regulations for admission which were to be promulgated in 1820 and were discussed earlier in this chapter.

For several years after Waterloo the Government continued to pour money into Sandhurst to provide all the facilities that were required for a military education but the years of peace inevitably made the calls for economies more strident. Eventually, in 1819, with the total expenditure on buildings and facilities at nearly £370,000 the annual budget was drastically cut from £60,000 to £30,000. The number of orphan cadets had already been reduced to eighty in 1817 and the fees for all the others were increased. By 1820 the number of cadets admitted free was reduced to only ten and shortly afterwards the free system was abolished completely(28). Discipline at the College was dominated by Colonel Butler, who had succeeded Le Marchant as Lieutenant-Governor in 1811. His personality does not appear to have improved over the years. He was inclined to ignore the orphans and strongly favour the sons of nobles - in short he was a most dreadful snob. The masters were required to have any punishments they gave confirmed by Butler and one can only wonder at the feelings of the german-master who complained in 1822 that: *"When I called Cadet Man to order, this cadet put an eyeglass to his eye and began to view me with marked distaste."*(29) Butler remained at Sandhurst until 1828 when, after charges of tampering with examinations for the benefit of rich cadets, misusing government property, unfairly punishing innocent cadets and accepting bribes had been investigated by the Governor, Lord Paget, he at last resigned(30) and was replaced by Colonel Sir George Scovell who was to remain as the less than active Lieutenant-Governor until 1837 and then to be the Governor until 1856.

PERIOD OF DEPRESSION (1821 - 1854)

From 1821 until 1854 the Senior Department did little more than continue to exist at Sandhurst. General Sir Howard Douglas, who had commanded the Senior Department since 1806 (with a break of eighteen months when he served under Sir John Moore as Assistant-Quartermaster-General from February 1808) became tired of losing in his fight to prevent economies - students were living in vacated masters' houses in tea-caddy row, there was no mess and the classes were given in one of the Junior Department's halls-of-study. The student officers were left to their own devices for much of the time and morale and the previously high quality of instruction fell. Douglas left the College in 1824 and was not replaced. The head of the Senior Department fell to a self-taught mathematics professor, John Narrien, who had earlier been on the staff of the Junior Department. The lack of military staff had a direct influence on the military education which almost disappeared from the curriculum. In an attempt to rectify this Narrien tried to teach some of Jarry's old Instructions - he grappled with fortifications, castrametation, gunnery and tactics. He was remarkably successful in his mastery of fortifications; this was proved in 1862 when a cadet 'mutiny' took over the Redoubt (a defensive position built by Narrien to demonstrate the principles of fortification) and it proved impregnable to the assaults of the authorities(31). Unfortunately, Narrien's effort to retain adequate military instruction was in vain. In 1832 the vote of public money for the College was withdrawn and it was required to exist on the cadets' fees and the thirty guineas paid annually by the student

officers. Vacancies for admission to both departments went unfilled and the reputation of the College went into decline. Those officers who could not pass the examinations were granted extensions to the course which almost automatically became a two year course for those who had not been to the Junior Department and an eighteen month course for those who had. The examinations, which were held every six months became farcical. The Supreme Board came down from London and listened while Narrien asked each candidate a number of well-rehearsed questions. One student described the absurdity of the whole proceeding:

...the veteran generals in their plumed hats seated in the classroom, who beheld the blackboards covered with mystic signs and figures, emblems of hidden lore, with an air of solemn and silent wisdom: solemn through ignorance and silent through having nought to say. (32)

Despite Narrien's lenient attitude towards examinations, or perhaps because of it, it became necessary to review the passing-out standard and in 1836 no fewer than three grades of Military College Certificate were adopted. The students tended to be those who were married and wanted to avoid overseas service or those who simply wanted to shirk their regimental duties and without Le Marchant's iron resolve to maintain standards they were allowed to get away with it. Any officer who had applied to the College in order to improve his military knowledge soon discovered he was wasting his time. Narrien had given up trying to master tactics and apart from fortifications there was not a single military subject in the syllabus. The only mention of military history found by Godwin-Austen in the Staff College archives was: "There will be no lecture on military history tomorrow morning." (33)

Things were no better in the Junior Department. Since 1828, when Scovell had taken over as Lieutenant-Governor, there had never been more than two-hundred cadets at Sandhurst. They were divided into two companies and the instruction was given to six forms which were divided into the upper and lower school. The cadets had to pass exams in order to transfer from one form to the next and the emphasis was placed upon mathematics (called "swot" by all the cadets).

Life in the College was severely spartan; there was no library, no canteen and no recreation area. The food was dull and there was rarely enough of it. The daily routine was uninspiring in that it had hardly changed since the days at Marlow. However despite these failings by 1848 some three-hundred and sixty generals and field officers had been through the College. It was also calculated that of a total of three thousand cadets that had been to the Junior Department, one hundred had been killed in action and two-hundred and seventy wounded. It became clear that there was no practical advantage to be gained from attending the course(34) and by 1854 there were only six officers studying for the once important qualification of the Military College Certificate.

At this point it must be said that probably the worst obstacle to continuing the progress made in the early days had been the Duke of Wellington. Despite having been served by Mycobites during the Peninsular War and at Waterloo, he was believed to think that all

military education was a waste of time. He was a firm believer in the purchase of commissions and promotions and suggested once to the Chaplain-General: *"..if there is a mutiny in the Army....these new-fangled schoolmasters are at the bottom of it."*(35) Wellington and his generals, who were all influenced by the great man, grew old during a period of peace which they had bought with their victories. It is ironic that the Army should have suffered as a result of the mismanagement of these same brave soldiers but that it did is incontrovertable. It is true that Wellington unbent sufficiently to order a common examination for all candidates for a commission, whether by purchase or not, in February 1849. The following year a promotion exam was introduced but there were no other initiatives and, as Thomas says; those that mourned Wellington's death in 1852 did not know that he was responsible for the inadequacies of the Army two years later when it was sent to the Crimea. The Crimean War, which was declared by France and Britain on the 28th March 1854, caused a revival of interest in the College as a whole.

All the experience gained during the early days had been forgotten by 1854. The duties of the Quartermaster-General's Department had not been properly studied since 1820 when the Senior Department had moved to Sandhurst and there were no officers who had even a theoretical knowledge of the subject. The Army had no understanding of, or organisation for, such essentials as; transport, stores or medical services. Lord Hardinge, the Commander-in-Chief, who inherited this mess from Wellington in 1852, made some effort to improve matters and he was

ably assisted by Major-General His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge who had been appointed one of the commissioners of the College in 1850. The Duke had already embarrassed the Adjutant-General, Sir George Brown, by discovering that he was unaware of the existence of a new drill book and was still using the one published by Sir David Dundas in 1792. He shook up the Home Army which he found to be totally disorganised by ordering a two-month long exercise, the first for several years, on Chobham Common in 1853. The cadets and officers at Sandhurst were allowed to seize the advantage offered by having large bodies of troops in the field and resumed some of their military studies. Hardinge was also busy and by the outbreak of the war, he ensured that the Army was equipped with the requisite number of wagons and guns. Wellington had persistently refused to give up the old smooth-bore musket in favour of the new Minie rifle and this was the reason why so many British soldiers embarked for the campaign with the old-fashioned weapon.

With no trained staff officers available to him, the Commander-in-Chief of the Expeditionary Force, Lord Raglan, was required to revert to the old system of appointing staff on a basis of personal selection. Two months after the start of the war, out of a total of two-hundred and ninety one officers on the staff, only fifteen had been through the Senior Department. Years of disregard for the College robbed the Army of the professionally-trained officers it needed to fight a European war. Patronage was back to being as important as it had been in 1798(36).

PERIOD OF REFORMATION (1854 - 1858)

The scope of this thesis does not extend to a study of the general unreadiness of the Army for war in 1854. It is sufficient to note that the neglect of the Senior Department in particular led to a crisis within the Government and at Horse Guards at the outbreak of the war against Russia. As a result of the urgent demands of Parliament and the public, this period became a time of immense reform within the command structure of the combined land forces of the Army and the Ordnance (see the notes to Appendix 3). The Government had already ordered that the Commissariat was to be transferred from the Treasury to the War Department, under the Secretary-of-State for War, in December 1854. The whole system of small, independent offices and departments was about to be streamlined. This started with the transfer of control of the artillery and engineers to the Commander-in-Chief. The Ordnance Board was dissolved and its civil duties were transferred to the Secretary-of-State(37). In January, 1855, the Secretary-at-War, Sidney Herbert, set up a select committee of the House of Commons to investigate the situation at Sandhurst and to report its findings on the system of military education. After due deliberation, the committee returned its report on the 18th June, by which time Herbert had resigned. It condemned the Senior Department as: *"..not in any way carrying out the scheme for which it was originally instituted."* It went on to recommend some immediate changes:

1. That a military officer should be at its head.

2. That it should have a separate staff of professors.
3. Parliament should be called on to grant money for maintenance.
4. That officers who receive Senior Department certificates should not be neglected in the matter of staff appointments.(38)

The report revealed that there were some serious omissions concerning the organisation of the land forces. There was no official manual of staff duties, no authorised work on tactics existed and there was no ruling on the specific duties of either an assistant adjutant-general or assistant quartermaster-general. It also included reference to General Sir Howard Douglas'(39), views that the annual intake should immediately be increased to thirty, a greater emphasis needed to be placed on tactics and military history and, most important, graduates of the Senior Department should be given preference for employment with the general staff. The full extent of the problem, though, can only be understood in the light of the following observations by Lieutenant Colonel Charles Napier, who had been to Farnham in 1817 and was severely critical of the entire course at a time when things had really been going quite well:

Superb College Humbug. He did pass a decent examination; but the whole course was contemptible and of no use to a military man beyond this, that a man studying mathematics, fortification and drawing for two years must learn something. But the style of the Military College was better calculated to make ten ignorant and most conceited fools than one officer. Sir Howard Douglas is perfectly ignorant of military affairs and anything but able and could not teach what he did not know. Officers left Farnham with a smattering of mathematics, of drawing, of fortifications - and a thorough conviction of their vast military acquirements..(40)

The new Secretary-of-State for War, Lord Panmure had endorsed these opinions when he wrote the following on taking office in February:

The system by which an Army should be provisioned, moved, brought to act in the field and the trenches, taught to attack or defend, is non-existent...we have no means of making general officers or of forming an efficient staff.(41)

Unfortunately the report was not successful in achieving anything at the time, perhaps because its recommendations were too timid(42). However, long before the war ended, a large body of influential soldiers and politicians had decided that a competent staff was essential to carrying out successful operations abroad. In 1856 a committee of three officers was appointed to investigate the whole of the training and education of officers of the Army and to compare it with other European armies. The members roundly condemned the College in their report which was submitted in January 1857. They compared it unfavourably with all the other European countries and even included a comparison of the cost of educating the respective staffs. The figures were: France L5,814 per year, Prussia L3,234, Austria L4,300 and Britain nil(43). Panmure submitted proposals for a "...design to raise the professional character of army officers.." which included the inauguration of a staff school at Sandhurst and suggestions for the constitution of a Council of Military Education, to be under the authority and guidance of the Commander-in-Chief. In 1857 he wrote:

Subject to your Majesty's approval, it appeared advisable at once to initiate the Staff School by enlarging the Senior Department at Sandhurst to thirty students and placing a military superintendent over it with an efficient body of professors to aid him.(44)

Students of the new school were to be selected by the Commander-in-Chief from a short list of officers who had achieved a fixed standard of qualifications which was published as General Order Number 685 dated the 9th April 1857. It became effective on the 1st January 1858. Lord Panmure wrote to the Prime Minister, Lord Palmerston on this subject on the 7th April and the following extract serves to show how detailed the new regulation was - the full text of these regulations is reproduced by Godwin-Austen(45):

I would like to add to the qualifications of an aide-de-camp the writing of a good, legible hand.....the officers of the Army are apt, in general, to write like kitchen-maids.(46)

The Prince-Consort was also involved with the reforms and gave his advice freely to the Commander-in-Chief on a range of matters concerning the purchase of commissions, the Staff School and its curriculum and the composition and duties of the Council of Military Education. By December 1857 the Council was ready to publish the new regulations which had been agreed by the Crown and Parliament. The full particulars are reproduced at Appendix 5. The Queen approved the change in the title of the Senior Department to the Staff College and announced that a new building would be erected in the grounds of Sandhurst. The Royal Military College ceased to be a blend of Le Marchant's first two departments - instead it was to concentrate on military studies that would benefit a young officer on joining his regiment. The Prince Consort had written to the Commander-in-Chief in 1856:

...the suggestion that I recommend is, therefore, to get gentlemen with a gentleman's education from the public schools (fee-paying) and do away with your military schools for boys as a competing nursery for the Army. Test their qualifications and then give them two years at a military college.(47)

Sandhurst adopted its new role as two separate colleges in 1858. The first competitive examination for entrance to the Staff College was held in February 1858 - one month after the first competitive examination was held for entrance to the Royal Military College (nee the Junior Department). The Staff College was open to all arms and services and the students would undergo two years instruction in both academic and practical military subjects. Half-yearly examinations were held and all the failures, and those who were considered unlikely to pass the final examination, were returned to regimental duty. The Staff College was independent from the Royal Military College although as the Commandant, Lieutenant Colonel PL Macdougall, was junior in rank and appointment to the Governor, General Sir Harry Jones, he was required to send administrative and disciplinary reports through him. The cadets at the Military College would have to survive a three year course and they could only enter between the ages of sixteen and eighteen. The cost of this education was to be charged to the Army Estimates. Fees were still charged but there were a number of free places for those who could not afford them. The first intake of about one-hundred and eighty cadets under this new system joined the College in September.

In 1858, fifty-nine years after the birth of the Senior Department, having progressed from the revolutionary period of its founding to the evolutionary period of growth, and almost ruin, the training scheme which had been proposed by a cavalry colonel finally came of age. A list of those who influenced the scheme during the period is at *Appendix 6*. The experiences of other European armies had, at last, been considered by the British military command and the decision to be prepared in the future for war, resulted in the firm establishment of two distinct training schools for the education of the officers of the British Army.

CHAPTER 3 - ENDNOTES

1. Denis Le Marchant. Memoirs of General Le Marchant, p.108.
2. AR Godwin-Austen. The Staff and the Staff College, p.22.
3. Denis Le Marchant. Memoirs of General Le Marchant, p.108.
4. Denis Le Marchant. Memoirs of General Le Marchant, p.113. RH Thoumine. Scientific Soldier, A Life of General Le Marchant 1766-1812, p.91.
5. Denis Le Marchant. Memoirs of General Le Marchant, p.113.
6. RH Thoumine. Scientific Soldier, A Life of General Le Marchant 1766-1812, p.66. (Author's note - Le Marchant calculated that, with an annual income of £31,000 from fees, the College would make a profit of £141,500 in thirty years.)
7. The Letters and Military Papers of Le Marchant 1800-11, The Library of the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst.
8. RH Thoumine. Scientific Soldier, A Life of General Le Marchant 1766-1812, pp.84-98.

9. AF Mockler-Ferryman. Annals of Sandhurst, p.88.
10. AR Godwin-Austen. The Staff and the Staff College, p.27.
11. *ibid.* p.32.
12. *ibid.* p.34.
13. *ibid.* p.33.
14. RH Thoumine. Scientific Soldier, A Life of General Le Marchant 1766-1812, pp.102-103.
15. *ibid.* p.111.
16. AR Godwin-Austen. The Staff and the Staff College, p.52.
17. *ibid.* p.57.
18. *ibid.* p.63.
19. *ibid.* p.64.
20. Peter Shepperd. Sandhurst, pp.28-37.
21. Hugh Thomas. The Story of Sandhurst, pp.39-40.
22. Gwyn Harries-Jenkins. The Army in Victorian Society, p.65.
23. RH Thoumine. Scientific Soldier, A Life of General Le Marchant 1766-1812, p.93.
24. *ibid.* p.83.
25. Hugh Thomas. The Story of Sandhurst, p.55.
26. *ibid.* p.63.
27. Sebastien La Prestre Vauban (1633-1707); a Marshal of the French Army under Louis XIV, he conducted sieges and rebuilt the defensive forts along the Eastern border of France.
28. Hugh Thomas. The Story of Sandhurst, p.66.
29. *ibid.* p.70.
30. *ibid.* pp.76-79.
31. AR Godwin-Austen. The Staff and the Staff College, p.74.

32. *ibid.* p.76.
33. *ibid.* p.78.
34. AF Mockler-Ferryman. Annals of Sandhurst, p.90.
35. Hugh Thomas. The Story of Sandhurst, p.80.
36. AR Godwin-Austen. The Staff and the Staff College, p.88.
37. Sir George Douglas and Sir George Dalhousie Ramsay. The Panmure Papers, p.491.
38. AF Mockler-Ferryman. The Annals of Sandhurst, p.90.
39. General Sir Howard Douglas was the Commandant of the Senior Department between 1806-1824 and the Inspector General of Education. He studied the military education of Prussia, France Austria and Russia.
40. Brian Bond. The Victorian Army and the Staff College 1854-1914, pp.53-54.
41. AR Godwin-Austen. The Staff and the Staff College, p.89.
42. Brian Bond. The Victorian Army and the Staff College 1854-1914, p.60.
43. *ibid.* p.65.
44. Sir George Douglas and Sir George Dalhousie Ramsay. The Panmure Papers, pp.371-373.
45. AR Godwin-Austen. The Staff and the Staff College, pp.97-99.
46. Sir George Douglas and Sir George Dalhousie Ramsay. The Panmure Papers, p.373.
47. Hugh Thomas. The Story of Sandhurst, p.108.

CHAPTER 4

EXPOSURE OF THE STAFF TO WAR IN THE PENINSULAR (1808 - 1814) AND THE CRIMEA (1854 - 1856)

There are several parallels between the organisation and deployment of the eighteenth century British expeditionary forces which set sail, forty-six years apart, to fight powerful European armies on rugged and poorly mapped terrain. The similarities begin right at the top with the appointment of the army commanders. The Commander-in-Chief had the authority to appoint the individual but the final selection was actually directed by Parliament. The selection and employment of the staffs was, similarly, the prerogative of Horse Guards but decisions were seriously affected by powerful outsiders, including ambitious politicians and senior officers who had influence at the War Office. Patronage and influence remained an important factor in the preferment of officers. It will be noted that during this period the British Army did not have a general staff of the type pioneered by the Prussians and later honed by them under General Von Moltke. Instead they tended to 'suddle-through' with competent regimental officers filling the posts required by the Adjutant and Quartermaster-generals at Horse Guards. However it is during this period that the need for a general staff first

became clear as even the great military leaders found that they could not handle all the new complexities of war by themselves(1).

The cavalry charges described in this Chapter depict two similar engagements, separated only by time and technological advancement (the introduction of the Minie rifle). The reasons behind the respective success and failure of the actions primarily involve the quality of leadership of the commanders and the effectiveness of the planning and preparation carried out by the commanders-in-chief and the army staffs.

The staff was employed to extend the range of influence of the commander in the field, nothing more. Before Napoleon increased the operational flexibility of his forces by establishing intermediate headquarters at divisional and corps levels, the standard tactical formation was a brigade and administration was heavily centralised. During these early days a field-commander could issue orders direct to his subordinates as distances were rarely very great and the central staff was able to administer the troops from headquarters through ration returns, disciplinary cases and casualty and medical reports. Occasionally the Adjutant-General or, more often, the Quartermaster-General might attach a deputy to a brigade for a particular move but this was unusual. In general terms the organisation and deployment of an army was a simple matter, unencumbered by problems of control because of its relatively small size and localized employment. General Scharnhorst suggested that the first commander to make use of the larger formations of infantry and cavalry divisions was Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick at

the battle of Vellinghausen in 1761(2). The advantages were fully appreciated by the French and they made use of them from early in the Revolutionary Wars. Napoleon formed divisions of two or more brigades and army corps of two or more divisions. He assigned full staffs at each level of command. This is a very important organisational change because it significantly extended the operational range of an army by making independent action possible at every level of command without denegrating the centralised control function. The British Army was not at all keen to adopt this decentralised system. It was not until 1809, during Wellington's Douro campaign in Portugal and the subsequent advance on Talavera in Spain, that divisions were permanently formed and established with specified staffs.

The military staff of an army abroad was divided between the commander's personal staff, the Adjutant and Quartermaster-generals' departments and the staff of the civil departments. Every general officer was allowed at least one aide-de-camp for whom the Treasury made a small allowance (9s.6d. a day in 1809). These officers were personally selected and kept by their generals. The appointment was a very personal matter and only lasted while the general held command. When Lieutenant Harry Smith (later Lieutenant General Sir Harry Smith who commanded during the Zulu wars in Southern Africa) was selected by Brigadier Sydney Beckwith he was met with a simple question: "Can you be my aide-de-camps?", to which he gave the startling reply: "Yes, I can ride and eat"(3). The aides were employed writing letters, taking messages (Captain Nolan was one of Lord Raglan's aides and delivered the final,

and fatally ambiguous, message(4) that resulted in the celebrated Charge of the Light Brigade in the Crimea on 25 October 1855) and taking care of minor administrative matters. The brigade-majors, although the senior staff officers in the brigade formation, were an exception to the normal rules of the personal staff in that their relationship with their commanders was less dependent upon personal influence and they had certain defined duties to perform. These duties included arranging the duty rosters and posting picquets, tasks that would hardly tax the ability of a non-commissioned officer today. The size of a commander's personal staff depended upon his rank; where a brigadier would normally be allowed his brigade-major and one aide-de-camps, General Graham, who commanded the joint force at Cadiz, had an enormous retinue which needed forty mules to carry it.

The loyalty of the officers working on the staff of a field army was divided. The simple relationship that exists now between a British commander and his staff was not established until after the formation of a general staff(5) in 1907 (more than fifty years after the Prussian model was introduced by General Von Moltke). Wellington's Quartermaster-General, Colonel George Murray, was required to report back to Horse Guards independently of the Duke and he sent accounts of operations and battles including sketches which were made especially for the official records. Murray corresponded freely with his subordinates who were attached to divisions or other forces and he retained the right to replace officers as he saw fit. General Airey, who held the same position in Lord Raglan's army forty-five years later, acted in

precisely the same way. The Adjutant-General and Military Secretary were similarly divided from their commander by established protocol. The remaining military staffs (more accurately described today as staff-advisors) of the medical, artillery and engineer branches also had their own specialist corps reporting chains. These branches were, and are, extremely important in their own right but they do not form that nucleus of staff with which we are concerned so they will not be discussed further in this chapter. However, although each of the branches had its own reporting chain, the commander was still able to exert some considerable influence over the individuals who formed the staff. Wellington was famous for having reduced his Adjutant-General, General Charles Stewart, brother of the Secretary-of-State, Lord Castlereagh, to tears when he disagreed about who should have the responsibility for the interrogation of the prisoners-of-war. The personality of the commander was what held the headquarters staff together. Things have not changed and whereas Wellington's style was dynamic and forceful, Raglan's was cautious and diplomatic. The reader will make his own conclusions about which was most likely to achieve results.

Wellington rarely interfered with his departments provided they did not interfere with his own plans and intentions(6). Raglan was similarly disposed, but possibly through a lack of interest or concern rather than as a deliberate policy. This is inferred from the early correspondence between the new Secretary-of-State, Lord Palmerston, and Lord Raglan during February and March 1855. In a letter dated 12

February, 1855, Panmure, who was suffering severe public criticism of the deplorable conditions being suffered by the army in the Crimea, wrote:

"....I believe you have been misled by your staff and more especially by your Quartermaster-General ... in this Major General Airey has totally failed."(7).

He went on to demand more detailed reports on the state of the troops and even went as far as to suggest that a senior officer should be sent from England to become a chief-of-staff and test the abilities of the staff officers. Raglan's response(8) was carefully worded, diplomatic and with a hint that the criticism had deeply offended him. The editors of the Panmure Papers which were published in 1908 make it clear that they considered Raglan was seriously at fault for not controlling his command through the proper employment of his staff officers(9).

But what did a commander require of the staff in the field during the nineteenth century? We have seen that Wellington was not the sort of commander who would always be prepared to accept advice from his staff officers (although he must frequently have been offered advice by them) or who would encourage them to issue orders without his knowledge. Even George Murray, in whom he had the greatest faith, hesitated to act independently of the great man although there are instances of his having done so successfully(10). Lord Raglan, though raised in the Wellington tradition, had a very different personality and tended to be

blind to everything that he could not personally see or easily understand. Examples of this myopia are his failure to allow the cavalry to exploit the infantry's victory at the Alma and his refusal to deal effectively with the appalling relationship that existed between the commander of cavalry, Lord Lucan and his extraordinarily arrogant commander of the Light Brigade, Lord Cardigan(11).

The Quartermaster-General was junior in position to the Adjutant-General but he was paradoxically the most important and influential officer on the staff. His duties, as we have seen from the discussion in Chapter Two and from the notes to *Appendix 3*, were diverse and his responsibilities far-reaching. There were no significant changes in the structure or tasks of this branch between the Peninsular and Crimean wars. The civil branch of the Commissary-General on the other hand had experienced some radical changes by 1858, including being removed from the control of the Treasury and being placed directly under the command of the War Department. Other major reforms of the supporting elements included the formation of a transport corps, a police corps and a general-works corps, all of which were established in the aftermath of the terrible privations suffered by the over-extended and ill-equipped Army of the Crimea during 1854-1855.

Wellington liked to see the heads of his staff branches daily. He demanded detailed information in the form of verbal briefings from his officers. He had a great ability to sort the important issues from the less-important in the same way that Napoleon could. A French

ambassador to London during Wellington's premiership, later said that he (Wellington) could transact as much business in thirty minutes as a French minister could in thirty hours(12). Whereas the final decisions always rested on his shoulders, by both desire and intent, the regular meetings provide evidence that he was ready to consult his staff and it is likely that he listened to their opinions with greater concentration than he is often given credit for. During the eighteenth century it had been common for a commander or even the Secretary-of-State (as in the Helder expedition in 1799) to call councils of war in order to delegate specific tasks and, if necessary, to reorganise forces. These councils were attended by general officers and members of the headquarter's staff. As late as 1809 Lord Chatham, the Secretary-of-State, summoned one before evacuating Walcheren, but they were slow and cumbersome affairs which were rejected by Sir John Moore during his period in command of the Army in Portugal during 1808 and never used by Wellington. To quote Francis Grose again (a military humorist who wrote "Advice to Officers" in 1789 - see Chapter One, Endnote 8):

...as no other person in your Army is allowed to be possessed of a single idea it would be ridiculous, on any occasion, to assemble a council of war, or at least to be guided by their opinion.(13)

Wellington tried to introduce a chief-of-staff to his headquarters in 1812 by double-hatting his new Quartermaster-General, Willoughby Gordon. The idea was dropped after only a few weeks because Gordon proved incapable of filling the role. The fact that Wellington repeated the experiment when George Murray returned to his Army in 1813

shows a determination to encourage a greater degree of delegation to his staff officers. The complexity of conducting operations over long distances and difficult terrain without any direct communications equipment was clearly beginning to have an effect. Wellington's Army was concentrated on a single line of operation but he manoeuvred his forces along multiple lines of communication in columns. He had the added burden of keeping in touch with the operations of the separate contingent at Cadiz under General Graham, the Spanish regular forces under General Cuesta, the Portuguese under General Silveira and a multitude of effective guerilla bands. The degree of co-ordination required to concentrate forces at the right time in the right place demanded a keen and able staff which could interpret the commander's intent and accurately calculate the mechanics of the move. Multiple lines of manoeuvre were central to Wellington's conduct of campaigns. There was a real need for a staff co-ordinator in the Peninsular but it was not until Murray's appointment as Chief-of-Staff of the Allied contingents in France after the battle of Waterloo that this position was properly established.

The Duke's belief in the superiority of the purchase system over merit for commissions was well known in Horse Guards. However the increased size of the Army since the renewed war against France had begun in 1803 led to a new class of officers who entered the service through the Military College. Promotion was not easy to achieve for these entrants but it was not impossible and the official line was that promotions should be made on merit alone. SGP Ward, in his book on

Wellington's Headquarters describes the Duke's position marvellously: "The great revolution of sentiment had passed Wellington by...". Efficient, courageous and able officers earned due recognition from him but he felt that insufficient help was given to those who could offer merit with money and influence. He described the officers from the Royal Military College as: "...coxcoabs and pedants" but it is clear from a glance at the table of the staff of his Quartermaster-General's department at Appendix 7 that a large number of his staff officers had attended the Senior Department and his heavy cavalry brigade was commanded by the officer who, as the inspiration for a training scheme and architect of the Royal Military College, we have already studied in some detail; John Gaspard Le Marchant.

Major General Le Marchant, commanding 800 sabres, was the sort of dynamic and effective leader needed by Wellington. It was he who, immediately before the battle of Salamanca on 22 July 1812, was ordered by Wellington to take advantage of the first opportunity that presented itself to charge the enemy's infantry. He had ordered Le Marchant on 21 July: "You must then charge at all hazards". Le Marchant fulfilled his promise with an astonishing display of personal courage and complete command and control of his small but well drilled force. There was no tactical plan during the Battle of Salamanca although a detailed knowledge of the ground was essential and both sides endeavoured to encourage the other to fight where they would ultimately be at a disadvantage. It is very difficult to achieve surprise under these circumstances and once the armies were in sight of each other there was

little for the staff to do but carry messages and make the routine dispatches to Horse Guards. Both sides marched and counter-marched their forces, each of about fifty-thousand men, for two days in an attempt to outflank each other. It was more by careful observation of the enemy and seizing the opportunity, rather than deliberate planning, that Wellington was able to suddenly exclaim with confidence (just as he was prepared to withdraw his army from the field and retire to Portugal): "By God they are extending their line; order my horses." He told the Spanish liaison officer then that the French were lost and he rode immediately to order his 3rd Division, commanded by his brother-in-law, Edward Packenham, to attack against Marmont's over extended left flank. Wellington's ability to be in the right place at the right time was clearly of considerable importance and the decision making process generated by four years of war mixed with a leadership style verging on the heroic resulted in a marvellous victory at Salamanca.

Le Marchant attacked Clausel's infantry division of 5,000 troops which was deploying to fill the gap in the left flank of the French army which had been made by the assault of Packenham's 3rd Division. A sketch-map of the engagement is reproduced at Appendix 8. The surprise achieved by Le Marchant was enough to destroy Clausel's force and his brigade took 1,500 prisoners. The proudest moment of Le Marchant's life must have been that cavalry charge which owed its success to no other unit. He joined a final charge with half a squadron of the 4th Dragoons against a small group of enemy when victory was already his and died a relatively futile death as a result of this action. Wellington mourned

his death and spoke of Le Marchant both publicly and privately as "a very able officer". Certainly his timely exploitation of a shaken enemy was an action worthy of the Duke who had once written to a brother officer in India: "...dash at the first fellowsA long decisive war will ruin us."(14).

It was the sort of bold stroke which epitomised what Wellington required of his subordinate commanders; it was intelligently thought, carefully controlled and savagely executed. Where there is little evidence of tactical planning in the broader sense, on behalf of the staff, there is a good deal to suggest that the tactical awareness of the commander was absolute. Also the military strategy (perhaps better described as the operation-plan although the operational sphere of war had not been recognised at the time) which resulted in this battle, which was the start of the defeat of the French in the Peninsular, had been carefully calculated. Wellington described his campaign planning as "taking trouble" and in this his staff had a heavy responsibility. In particular the logistic support of his army was a prime concern. He was very pleased to leave the mechanics of supplies and provisions to his Quartermaster-General. However a good deal of his correspondence(15) shows that he was always aware of the state of his troops and fought hard to ensure that he got what he needed to maintain his force. One example of his concern for the well-being of his soldiers is in a letter written to Lieutenant General Sir Thomas Graham on 24 June 1812:

The enemy's infantry and cavalry have moved to the rear, as you will have observed; but I see that they are getting under arms at Aldea Rubia, and on the hill on the right of that village. I think it advisable, therefore, that if the men of the 1st, 6th and 7th divisions are not cooking they should move to the ford of Santa Marta. If they are cooking, the movement may as well be delayed till they have done, unless I should see a reason to make it earlier, of which I will give you notice.(16)

The essential functions of operational and tactical planning were Wellington's responsibility and he gave detailed instructions to his commanders to ensure that they complied with his tactical intentions. The task of gathering intelligence on the other hand was something which had to be delegated to individuals who would volunteer to go behind enemy lines or stay just in front of an advancing enemy force and report its position, direction and speed of march. Napoleon had already proved in the low countries how important a well organised intelligence network was. Local people might prove to be a good source of information but they could not always be relied upon and there was always a risk of hearing exaggerated or understated facts from them. Wellington employed a number of regimental officers in this role. One of the better known of these was Major the Honourable Edward Charles Cocks who, in his own words: *"...went off on fact-finding missions across Spain and Portugal..."*(17). Cocks was an extraordinary man, intelligent and very well read he was passionate about the Army and his regiment, the 16th Light Dragoons. He applied for entry to the Senior Department in 1804 after service in Ireland but he was only eighteen and so refused a place. The following year he took the family seat in Parliament and so missed General Jarry's lectures that he would have enjoyed so much. A

detailed account of his contribution to the British success in the Peninsular is given by Julia Page in her book *"Intelligence Officer in the Peninsular"*. It is sufficient to say here that Cocks and his colleagues were invaluable to the Duke and constituted, unofficially, the intelligence (or G2) branch of his staff. Without these officers he would not have known the dispositions of Marshal Soult (in the South), General Dorsenne (in the North) and Marshal Jourdin (in Madrid). In fact he knew the strength of Marmont's forces to within one hundred men and the position of every other French unit in the central region. He also knew that the diversionary operations of the irregular Spanish forces which he had ordered with the regular allied forces under generals Graham and Hill (18) were working and that Marmont could not expect to be reinforced. His intention to defeat Marshal Marmont was based on this information from his intelligence staff. His strategy was to sever the communication lines between Soult, Marmont and Jourdin, destroy Marmont, who he knew would not give up central Spain, and then advance on Madrid. In this sense the final staff branch, that of G3 (Operations and Planning), was entirely a one-man affair.

By 1854 the British Army had enjoyed nearly forty years of peace in Europe. Recent experience of war was the prerogative of the British Indian Army whose officers were generally considered to be social outcasts. Despite the fact that these officers were the only ones with recent experience of war in a practical sense, few were found a place in the Army which sailed to the Crimea. The outbreak of war came just before some significant changes, aimed at improving standards, were to

be introduced to the training scheme at Sandhurst. The sufferings of British soldiers at Scutari, Varna, Calamita Bay and finally at Sebastopol were excused as the consequence of the country's lack of preparation for war. The excuse is weak; it does not explain the lack of suitable clothing provided for the troops, nor does it explain the apparent indifference with which the soldiers' plight was ignored by their officers. It was widely argued that the absence of trained and experienced staff officers exacerbated the problems inherent in an inhospitable environment. However after the war an official inquiry found that the Commissary-General, a Mr Filder, was the only man worthy of blame for the dreadful conditions for failing to issue lime juice, which was considered a medical comfort, and tea to the soldiers(19). Such nonsense epitomises the neglect of the Army during the war and points directly at the urgent need for reform of the supply and administrative systems. The staff could hardly be blamed for the failings of the system. A lack of training and a poor understanding of their responsibilities was not likely to result in reforms at the grass-roots level.

The country of the Crimea was almost entirely waterless except for the main rivers which were usually defended by the enemy. The British and French soldiers who had the misfortune to be part of the advancing Army, having endured the sickness (cholera), poor food, insanitary conditions and inactivity of the camps en-route, were required to fight a well disciplined and maintained force which had had time to prepare its defences. The success of the allied force owed a

great deal to the fortitude of the soldiers and the courageous leadership of their officers; it had nothing to do with careful planning, accurate intelligence, adequate sustainment or adherence to the principles of war - luck played a larger part than all of these.

Lord Raglan took command of the British Expeditionary Force of the Crimea when it sailed in the Spring of 1854. He was sixty-six years old, an intimate friend of the Duke of Wellington until his death in 1852, and he had never commanded even a company in the field before. The commanders and staff officers were later described by Lord Wolseley in scathing terms:

Good Heavens! What generals then had charge of England's only army and of her honour and fighting reputation! They were served to a large extent by incompetent staff officers, as useless as themselves; many of them were "flaneurs about town", who knew as little of war as they did about the Differential Calculus. Almost all our officers at that time were uneducated as soldiers, and many of those placed upon the staff of the Army at the beginning of the war were absolutely unfit for the positions they had secured through family and political interest...They were not men whom I would have entrusted with a subaltern's picket in the field. Had they been private soldiers, I don't think any colonel would have made them corporals. (20)

The decline of the Senior Department, which has already been discussed in some detail, and the lack of professionalism were two sides of the same coin. Lord Raglan was perfectly happy to accept the old system of personal selection of staff officers on the basis of influence rather than merit. He also appears to have had more influence at Horse Guards than Wellington had in 1809; many of the staff at his headquarters during his period in command were personal friends or

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relations. Two hundred and sixteen officers attended the Senior Department between 1836-1854 but all except twenty had returned to regimental duty immediately. Two months after the start of the war the staff of the Army totalled two hundred and ninety-one officers of whom only fifteen had actually attended the staff course at Sandhurst. A few generals had obtained the military certificate including General Airey, the Quartermaster-General, but he, along with the others of his generation had been through the Senior Department during General Jarry's time and were, at best, hopelessly out-of-date. By early 1855 reports had reached England that the Army was in a fearful state, particularly regarding clothing and medical supplies. Airey was a reasonably capable officer who, at least in Lieutenant General Godwin-Austen's view(21) was rightly exonerated of the charges of incompetence that were brought against him later. The inescapable fact is that Lord Raglan, who had been a good staff officer himself, could not command an Army because, apart from other failings, he had no idea how to delegate duties and responsibility to others. Unlike his dynamic master in the Peninsular he was incapable of going to the heart of a matter without spending an inordinate amount of time inspecting it, prodding it and generally messing around with it. The inevitable outcome was that by the time a decision had been made on some matter the subject had changed out of recognition. He failed to see the advantages to be gained from improved communications, made possible by the new telegraph which he hated: "...these electric wires upset all calculations, and cause infinite confusion.." (22), and he allowed routine paperwork to over-burden him. These failings severely affected the command of the Army .

The essential staff work which had been required in the Peninsular was still carried on between the staff branches and their respective masters in Horse Guards. This was the routine of reports, sketches of the area, casualty states and equipment holdings. Demands for stores were passed through the Quartermaster-General to the Commissariat which, as we have seen, had the authority to spend appropriated funds on locally purchased items including food, clothing, equipment and services. It is worth noting that Lord Raglan had no authority over the Commissary General, Mr Filder, who had received only two strict orders from the Treasury: "...to cut things fine, and get provisions locally..."(23). During the enquiry which followed in the wake of the war, one officer from the Quartermaster-General's office said: "...the Commissary-General seems to have desired his officers to issue rations according to his own views, instead of according to the General Orders of the Army"(24). It was not until control of the department was changed to the Commander-in-Chief on 22 December 1854 that matters of supply began to improve for the Crimean Army. It must be said that improvements under Lord Raglan's successors, generals Simpson and Codrington, during 1855-1856 were fast and effective.

The British Government's strategic plan was to force the Czar of Russia to settle his quarrel with the Sultan of Turkey by negotiation, thereby preserving Turkish sovereignty. The military objective was to defeat the Russian Army and destroy the Russian Fleet in the Black Sea.

It was believed that the fortress at Sebastopol was a key military position and that it must be captured or destroyed completely. This was made clear to Raglan by the Duke of Newcastle, the Secretary for War, in a letter dated 29 June 1854(25). The outcome of this and subsequent directions from Parliament, led to the operational plan agreed between Lord Raglan and the commander of the French Army, Marshal St Arnaud. Once again things had not changed since Wellington's days in command and the planning phase was conducted by the commanders themselves. The British staff dealt with movement plans, ration states and encampments. Unfortunately the lessons of General Jarry concerning castrametation were no longer studied in detail and the state of the camps varied from poor to disgraceful. The French force did not fare any better. They had brought cholera with them to Varna from Marseilles(26) which soon spread to the British camps. The disease was a persistent and dreadful cause of many thousands of casualties and deaths .It was carried by the armies from Varna to the Crimea with appaling consequences.

Pure staff work remained a dull, monotonous, business with little or no scope for initiative. From the time of the landing at Scutari, on the coast of the Sea of Marmara, until the Army reached Calamita Bay in the Crimea, control of supplies had been non-existent. At the same time intelligence about the enemy had not been gathered and transport requirements had, to a large extent, been ignored. Lord Raglan therefore began his campaign at a severe disadvantage. The Army crossed the Alma, skirted Sebastopol to the East, established a port facility to the South at Balaclava and began the siege of the fortress within four

months of the start of the campaign. The troops were enthusiastic, having won a significant victory at the Alma against a strong enemy in prepared positions, and morale was high in spite of the considerable deprivations that have already been discussed.

A sketch-map of the area around Balaclava is at Appendix 8. The Quartermaster-General, General Airey, could hardly have chosen a worse supply base than the small port of Balaclava for the siege operation. The French had been given access to a more convenient port, Kamiesch, which was closer to Sebastopol and had much better road access. The terrain in this area is extremely difficult. The supply track from Balaclava rose very steeply to Raglan's Headquarters and the vital ground overlooking the fortress. During the winter months this road was to become impassable as the surface was churned to a sea of mud by the wagons. In the end a railway line was built alongside the road which helped with the movement of stores but even this was poorly designed and shoddily built. Control of the Woronzoff road which connected Sebastopol with Yalta was essential as it ran along much of the high ground which commanded the area. This was the scene of the Charge of the Light Brigade; an action notable for the obedience and bravery of those that made the charge and the incompetence and stupidity of those that ordered it.

The Russian commander, Prince Menschikoff had gathered a force of about twenty-five thousand, including three thousand cavalry, at Tchourgoun and he intended to attack the British and French positions on

the heights. The operation began on 25 October 1854. The lack of British intelligence was almost complete and it was not until Canrobert's Hill had been taken that anyone appreciated the strength of the Russian assault. Lord Raglan, unlike his illustrious predecessor, chose to observe the fighting from a static position on the heights. He neither employed reconnaissance patrols nor made sure that his staff properly arranged for the supply and support of his forces - it might be argued in his defence that he could not reasonably prepare his army as he had no idea what was going to happen but this would suggest the responsibility was not his, which it clearly was. The Russian cavalry advanced to the South of the Woronzoff road, leaving the British Light Brigade unseen on their right. They were met by the Heavy Brigade under General Scarlett. The regiments of the Heavy Brigade included the 4th and 5th Dragoon Guards, both of which had been part of Le Marchant's Brigade at the battle of Salamanca. Although he had not been given any warning of the approach of the enemy General Scarlett wheeled his command, ordered a charge and succeeded in breaking the enemy attack with a stunning display of ferocious determination and control of his troops. The Russian cavalry force was beaten by superior cavalry soldiers while at the same time the 93rd Infantry Battalion (The Argyle & Sutherland Highlanders) had broken a charge of four squadrons of Russian cavalry on the heights above Balaclava. This latter victory became celebrated as *"the thin red line tipped with steel"*. (27)

Lord Raglan watched all of this action without issuing a single useful order. Two messages were actually sent to the commander of the

cavalry, Lord Lucan, concerning his dispositions but the distance was so great and the ground so bad that up to half-an-hour elapsed before either of the messages were received by which time of course the situation had changed. Lord Raglan also failed to enquire after additional information that might have been available to him if he had seen fit to send out reconnaissance patrols. His position afforded a good view of the area but it did not show him where the dead-ground was to Lord Lucan. This lack of observation, reconnaissance and preparation was entirely Raglan's fault but a moderately experienced and competent staff would at least have covered the last two points in detail. As it was the staff was as unimaginative as its commander. Lord Raglan wanted his cavalry to advance against the enemy and recover the defensive positions on the heights that had been taken a few hours earlier. Two further orders were sent; neither one of which was clear to an increasingly bewildered Lucan whose view of the battlefield was obscured by the hills which surrounded him. Raglan also failed in his ability to write unambiguous and direct instructions. His third order required the cavalry to advance, with the support of infantry, to recover the heights(28) which had been recently taken by the Russian infantry. The infantry support which was promised for the action, two divisions, was still some distance away and Lucan decided to wait for it to arrive. Lord Raglan then noticed the Russians preparing to carry off the captured guns from the heights and he sent a fourth order to Lord Lucan. This required the cavalry to advance to the front and prevent the Russians from carrying away the guns. Unfortunately another prominent terrain feature, the Fedioukine Heights to the North of the Woronzoff

road, had also been taken by a small force of Russian infantry and cavalry. The enemy now appeared to be on two sides of him and Lord Lucan had no idea what his commander meant by *"..to the front.."* (29). Finally the hapless Lucan could not see the positions which Lord Raglan intended to be the objectives for his attack. This confusion resulted in the fatal charge. The message from Lord Raglan was carried by Captain Nolan, a junior aide-de-camp, who was reckless, dashing and impossibly arrogant. He goaded Lord Lucan, who was still prone to being over-cautious (his nick-name was Lord Look-On) into acting immediately, without waiting for clarification of his orders. There was a lot of room for misinterpretation and Lucan managed to get everything wrong. He took the guns to be the Russian guns which were retiring with the Russian cavalry and he understood the *"front"* to mean the way he was facing at the time - straight down the valley of death to the East.

The Charge of the Light Brigade was a result of poor planning, poor preparation and incomplete and misleading orders. The personalities of the individuals also played a part in the disaster but above all it was caused by a lack of co-ordinated staff-work. The routine staff matters that have been described took the attention of the commander's team of military advisors away from the essential business of war-fighting, including a detailed reconnaissance of the ground and an accurate estimation of the threat. Lord Raglan was not able to redress the situation which resulted from these failings. The British Army had always thought that the cavalry was a superior force, both in terms of

prowess and social position, to the other arms. This is still forcefully opined by many officers today and a preponderance of British generals were, and are, drawn from the cavalry. The Duke of Wellington drily observed that whereas the cavalry of other armies had won victories, his own had invariably got him into scrapes. However when properly employed it remained a potent weapon and it was vital to the maintenance of mobility on the battlefield. The decisive factor remained the ability of the individual commander; his understanding of tactics and, most important, the way he could read and make best use of the ground. General Excellmans, a commander of French cavalry, was reported to have said:

Your horses are the finest in the world and your men ride better than any continental soldier; with such material the English cavalry ought to have done more than has ever been accomplished by them on the field of battle. The great deficiency is in your officers...the British cavalry officer seems to be impressed by the conviction that he can dash or ride over everything; as if the art of war were precisely the same as that of fox hunting. (30)

The Charge of the Light Brigade was celebrated as a success in the strange way that irrational acts of heroism sometimes are. The aftermath of the war however brought a spate of acrimonious debate about the state of the British Army, its professionalism and ability to sustain a modern war. The serious reforms of the Army that were discussed in Chapter 4 were aimed at improving the span of command by training officers to use their experience and wisdom to advise the commander on all matters pertaining to an operation. The evolutionary period of the Royal Military College had come to an end. It was to be

succeeded by another revolution in military education brought about by the concerned debate which followed the end of the war in 1856. By 1858 Le Marchant's Senior Department was replaced by the Staff College, Camberley and the evolution was to begin, at a higher level than before, all over again.

CHAPTER 4 - ENDNOTES

1. Theodore Ropp. War in the Modern World, p.157. (It is the Author's belief that an increasing awareness of the harsh realities of war amongst politicians and the public during the nineteenth century resulted in a need for battle-analysis, after-action reports and the development of doctrine in an attempt to justify the continued use of force as an acceptable tool of national policy).
2. SGP Ward. Wellington's Headquarters 1809-1814, p.51 (footnote).
3. *ibid.* p.36.
4. Cecil Woodham-Smith. The Reason Why, p.228.
5. Brian Bond. The Victorian Army and the Staff College, p.232.
6. SGP Ward. Wellington's Headquarters 1809-1814, p.42.
7. Sir George Douglas and Sir George Dalhousie Ramsay. The Panmure Papers Volume II, pp.521-524.
8. *ibid.* pp.525-527.
9. *ibid.* pp.497-499.
10. SGP Ward. Wellington's Headquarters 1809-1814, p.151.
11. Cecil Woodham-Smith. The Reason Why, p.188 and pp. 156-158.
12. SGP Ward. Wellington's Headquarters 1809-1814, p.154.
13. *ibid.* p.157.

14. John Keegan. The Mask of Command, p.145.
15. Gurwood. The Dispatches of Field Marshal The Duke of Wellington Volumes VIII and IX.
16. ibid. Volume IX p.248.
17. Julia Page. Intelligence Officer in the Peninsular, p.18.
18. Jac Weller. Wellington in the Peninsular, pp. 204-208.
19. Sir Edward Hamley. The War in the Crimea, p.185.
20. Cecil Woodham-Smith. The Reason Why, p. 135.
21. AR Godwin-Austen. The Staff and the Staff College. p.88.
22. ibid. p.89.
23. RD Barbor. Article on Administration in the Crimea: The Royal United Service Institution, p.872.
24. ibid. p.889.
25. Sir Edward Hamley. The War in the Crimea, p.26.
26. ibid. p.28.
27. ibid. pp.111-114.
28. Cecil Woodham-Smith. The Reason Why, p. 228.
29. Sir Edward Hamley. The War in the Crimea, p.117.
30. Cecil Woodham-Smith. The Reason Why, p. 134.

CHAPTER 5

THE TRAINING SCHEME

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The requirement for and development of the officer training scheme in the British Army of the early to mid-nineteenth century has been discussed in detail in the preceding chapters. The concept of the scheme, which was recommended to the Commander-in-Chief by Lieutenant Colonel John Gaspard Le Marchant in 1798, included a number of different sections but with a single goal. In essence, the aim was to educate young officers by establishing a common curriculum of military and associated subjects. The intended result was to set professional standards for achievement before commissioning and as a pre-requisite for employment as a staff officer.

Some of the original ideas concerning this thesis were found to be false during research. In particular the reader should now understand that in spite of many good intentions, and contrary to the author's initial belief, the Royal Military College was not an immediate success. The British armies of the Peninsular and Crimea did not benefit greatly from the wisdom of General Francois Jarry or John Narrien, Esq. The reasons for this failure to influence the professionalism of the Army

prior to 1858 are found, at least in part, in the answers to the research questions which were:

Why the scheme of education met with such antipathy and why the changes that were recommended were often ignored?

Why the Senior Department of the College was allowed to decay between 1821 - 1854?

How the Staff College finally gained recognition in 1858?

Analysis of the research material, combined with a detailed understanding of England's social conditions, has led to a number of subjective conclusions concerning these questions. These centre on three elements: education and the emergence of the powerful middle-classes, a strongly held conviction that the basis of leadership lay in heredity; and a belief that physical courage and audacity alone were needed to win wars. These elements are inextricably linked. They will be discussed in the light of the evidence contained in the preceding chapters.

The early nineteenth century was the time for a revolution of the middle-classes. The aim to achieve respectability for trades and new professions like engineering was pursued with enormous enthusiasm by a new, well educated and powerful section of society. The single most important event, both politically and socially, at this time was the passage of the Reform Act of 1832, by Parliament, which gave increased power to the middle-classes through expanded suffrage. The changes in society were as quick as they were inexorable and a system of qualifications was born which would determine whether an individual was acceptable to his peers for entry to his chosen profession. In a sense

it was the start of advancement through merit, although there was still a place for sponsorship. If any single attitude may be used to distinguish a professional(1) it is that a professional takes his business seriously. It is quite clear that the aristocratic part-time British Army officer of the nineteenth century was rarely serious about soldiering until he was physically committed to battle. Therefore it is reasonable to withhold the term professional from those officers who had not undergone any formal training, while still describing them as belonging to a profession. The Army was perhaps the most conservative of all the institutions that might, then, loosely be called professions and it easily became a target for criticism by the middle-classes.

Social prejudice, then, was the root-cause of antipathy toward the training scheme. The strength of purpose of the architects of the scheme and the prestigious positions held by some of the key proponents led to the birth of the College. This was described in Chapter 2. However the superior attitude of the gentry was so deep-rooted that active change was resisted at every opportunity. It is not likely that any officers from noble families ever considered the likelihood of their failing an entrance or graduation examination. The very idea of submitting themselves to a formal test of ability was therefore ridiculous and worthy only of contempt. We can add to the hereditary argument of leadership the fact that only the upper echelons of society were inclined, and able, to take part in military-type activities like riding, shooting and sword-play. Here then were the reasons behind the superior attitude of the ruling classes. It is a part of human nature to

hang on to a pre-eminent position. An individual who has achieved success in his chosen field may feel unreasonably threatened if he is asked to accept a new challenge which he might be unable to meet. There is a contemporary parallel to this historical analysis in the sudden advent of the ubiquitous computer. Some senior military commanders may try to avoid direct contact with computers simply because they are fearful of not being able to properly understand and manipulate them. This is the substance of the resistance to change during the period of revolution (1799-1812) described in this paper.

The heart of the system of purchase of commissions was rooted in a strong belief in the value of the gifted amateur and a mistrust of any who might earn their living through military service. Herein lies the belief that leaders are born, not made. Perhaps we lean too far in the other direction today and assume that anyone, given the right training, can become a competent leader. It would seem reasonable to suppose that there is a kernel of leadership in everyone which might be developed. However the size of that kernel must vary between individuals and, as with any gift, the will to use it must be strong. It is not so surprising therefore that, in an oligarchy, heredity was a powerful argument in the assessment of potential leaders.

The period of evolution described in this thesis covers the mainly formative years of the British cadet and staff colleges. Seventy-two years after the formation of the Senior Department in the *Antelope Inn*, High Wycombe, in 1799, the system of purchase was finally

abolished. It is the author's opinion that without the determination to improve the education of Army officers in line with the new professional attitude of the middle-classes the reforms of 1871 would not have been achieved. The important difference between the officers of the pre-Napoleonic and the Victorian eras was this mark of professionalism. Prior to 1799 officers tended to be either mercenaries (often despised but needed because of the pitiful size and power of the standing army) or aristocrats. Huntington is concise and essentially accurate when he says: *"In place of the professional goal of expert service, the former (the mercenary) pursued profit, the latter (the aristocrat) honour and adventure."*(2)

The selection of academic subjects for study at the Senior Department, particularly after 1824, was directed more by who was available to teach than what should be taught. The reader will doubtless draw his own conclusions regarding, for example, the need for an infantry officer to understand chemistry or Euclidean geometry. Debates on this have continued to tax the minds of educational reformists, military thinkers, commanders and enlightened officers ever since the birth of Le Marchant's scheme. However the broadening nature of the instruction cannot be overstated. Success in the classroom was generally considered to be unimportant at that time and most young men would have despised anything in the nature of careerism. We may summarise the collective aims of the training scheme proposed by Le Marchant in 1798:

Providing a military education for officers. To improve an individual's knowledge of his profession and, at the same time to broaden his understanding of allied subjects in order that he may attain professional status in the true sense of the word.(3)

The level of education at the Royal Military College and the curricula of the two departments was described in detail in Chapter 3. Emphasis was placed upon academic instruction to the detriment of military tactics and strategy (what we would now call operational art) which by their nature require instructors who have some practical experience and understanding of war. Le Marchant was convinced that the value of a military education lay in its broadness. He also believed the quality of an individual could be measured, at least in part, by his intelligence and application to academic studies. However the prominence accorded to purely scientific subjects was criticised by the Prince Consort in a letter to the Commander-in-Chief in 1857:

What is to be gained by making the officers of the Army, and the Staff in particular, abstract mathematicians instead of scientific soldiers?....If we were to make our Staff Officers theoretical mathematicians, we should inflict the greatest injury on the Queen's Service, for it is a well ascertained fact, and admitted all over the world, that mathematicians, from their peculiar bent of mind, do of all men show the least judgment for the practical purposes of life, and are the most helpless and awkward in common life, whilst the Staff Officer should have the greatest amount of knowledge of men and the world, and the greatest readiness in judging passing events and circumstances.(4)

Prince Albert was well known for his incisive mind and, presumably, for his long-winded style of writing. However the point is well made that a balanced education was what was called for. Too great an emphasis on either military subjects or on the purely scientific was

not what Le Marchant had in mind. His own curricula for the Junior and Senior departments mixed academic with military lessons and practical exercises with theory. Le Marchant would have agreed wholeheartedly with Captain Liddell Hart's concept of the conduct of war when he wrote: *"War is a science which depends upon art for its application."*

The employment of officers on the staff of the Army during the first half of the nineteenth century was neither scientific nor artful. The long period of peace between 1815 to 1854 resulted in a poorly trained staff with little experience and even less education. The decay of the Senior Department was both the cause and effect of resistance by the aristocratic minority to professional training. The value of a gifted amateur was thought to far outweigh that of the calculating professional. This view is still quite widely held today in the field of sporting competition. The reasons for decay of the College between 1821-1824 are the direct result of this resistance to change. However there is an additional dimension. There was no respected military theorist in England and without an influential teacher the College was bound to decline in stature. The loss of Francois Jarry in 1806 and General Le Marchant in 1812 left the College without the intellectual support it needed in order to evolve. One suspects that the works of Sun Tzu, Jomini and Clausewitz were rarely referred to at Horse Guards.

The changes recommended during the rough passage of the College's first fifty-five years were often ignored. This was partly because of an inadequate budget after 1819, but this in itself was only

a measure of a general lack of interest in the scheme. It was also due to a fairly arrogant conviction that the British Army could defeat any enemy against which it was set. For this somewhat paranoid view we must turn to the Duke of Wellington who, through his own genius, had sown the seeds of contempt for other armies amongst his subordinates. It was generally supposed that, in the event of a future war, the "Iron Duke" would take to the field again, in spirit if not in body. He was indispensable. Why else should he have been Prime Minister (1828-1830), Foreign Secretary (1834-1835), a member of the cabinet (1841-1846) and Commander-in-Chief for life from 1842? It was not surprising then that, in 1854, the sixty-six year old Lord Raglan should be selected to lead the Army to victory in the Crimea. Raglan had been Wellington's own Military Secretary and trusted staff officer and was therefore thought fit for the job. It appears ridiculous with hindsight that anybody could have thought that he was a sort of Wellington clone. However at the time it was perfectly reasonable to think that some of the Duke's genius had transferred itself to Raglan, presumably by osmosis.

The Duke's strength of character and formidable reputation was such that no one could gainsay him and the lack of preparedness for war in 1854 was, ultimately, his responsibility. War was entering a new era at this period. Napoleon had shown the enormous strength of a popular, people's army and had brought a new dimension to the battlefield by employing large, well staffed formations that were actually capable of independent action. To this flexibility was added the concentration of firepower made possible by increased artillery support and significant

improvements in the area of logistics. The new armies were suddenly better fed, and many regiments were better led and better trained in battle-drills than ever before.

The lack of timely reporting of poorly conducted military actions had, in the past, insulated commanders from the public. The advent of the telegraph, which Lord Raglan hated so much, changed everything: an unfavourable press rapidly became a sort of Damoclean sword hanging over the heads of even the most experienced (and aged) generals in the Crimea. The reforms that had been needed for so long were discussed in part three of Chapter 3. The strong feeling that a military education for officers was a sound principle but that the system had been allowed to decay through neglect was confirmed by the Secretary-of-State on 5 June 1856 in an address to the House of Commons:

....that department has languished, because, during peace, you have not taken officers from it for the Staff. You have not had your Army in divisions or brigades; and a number of scattered regiments does not deserve the name of an army, any more than a number of scattered men can be called a company. There has been no proper Staff employment, and there having been no great necessity for good Staff Officers, the Senior Department at Sandhurst has lost its prizes, and with them its efficiency. I want to restore it to its former effective state.(5)

It was the sudden realisation that catastrophe was only just being avoided in the Crimea in 1855 that saved the Senior Department. The Duke of Cambridge, as a governor of the College, had already begun to press for improvements in the field of military education in 1850. However it is unlikely that he would have been able to achieve very much in the way of reforms without the public outcry which resulted from the

news reports about the state of the Army in the Crimea. The reforms which took place between 1855-1858 were, in a sense, a way of placating an incensed public. The fact that the College already existed meant that there was no need for a new initiative. Le Marchant's original scheme provided a very adequate, albeit emaciated, body for re-clothing. It is interesting to note that the reformers went directly to Le Marchant's original notes in order to produce the new curriculum.

An understanding of this revolution in British military training is important today because it shows how fragile is the boundary between the success or failure of even great schemes. Le Marchant was lucky in the sense that his contribution to modern military thinking was appreciated during his own time, but had he lived and witnessed the decay of the College over forty years he must have despaired. The British Army was not the first to recognise the importance of officer training and during its early evolution it certainly did not provide the same standard of training as the Prussians, but then England did not have a Clausewitz or a Scharnhorst to maintain the momentum of the earliest days. Officer training in the British Army is more clearly established today than it has ever been. The correct mix of purely academic instruction with the science and art of ancient and modern warfare remains a constant topic for discussion. However a broad-based scheme of education remains the foundation of officer-training in the British Army. It is the author's opinion, then, that the original scheme, drafted by Le Marchant in an inn on the road to Guildford in 1798, was sound and of inestimable value to the British Army of today.

In conclusion, it is interesting to note that Parliament voted one thousand five hundred guineas for a monument to Le Marchant's memory in St Paul's Cathedral. This was an unusual, if not unique, gesture; to honour a young general with no aristocratic connections and no great military victories to his name. It is a monument which Lieutenant General Godwin-Austen, whose marvellous book on the Staff College provided so much of the background material for this thesis, found almost humorous. The tableau depicts a young woman who represents Spain, a tomb with a cameo of Le Marchant on its side, Britannia and a rather worried-looking cadet. It is perhaps a little confusing to the eyes of anyone who is not familiar with the story of achievement detailed in these chapters but the reader will not be disappointed if he should decide to visit it.

CHAPTER 5 - ENDNOTES


1. Author's definition of the term "professional" - see Chapter 1.
2. SP Huntington. The Soldier and the State, p.20.
3. Author's definition of Le Marchant's theme for education, based on the character of the individual and his stated desire to provide a challenging and varied course.
4. AR Godwin-Austen. The Staff and the Staff College, p. 102.
5. *ibid.* p.93.

APPENDIX 1

THE IMPORTANCE OF SKETCHING
EXAMPLES OF LE MARCHANT'S ART




Major-General le Marchant




From a sketch by M. General de Marmont

PORTALEGRE.



BRIDGE BETWEEN NIZA AND VILLA VELH



BRIDGE OVER THE SAL.



From a Sketch by M. General Le Marchant

VIEW FROM THE HILL above GABERNO.


APPENDIX 2

OUTLINE TIMETABLE OF EVENTS
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A TRAINING SCHEME

12 December 1798	General Jarry gave the first lectures to a class of officers at High Wycombe.
1 March 1799	Le Marchant's <i>Three Department</i> plan distributed for comment.
4 May	The Senior Department (third) opened at High Wycombe in a public house.
20 February 1800	The committee of military advisors approved Le Marchant's plan
14 August	The Prime Minister, Mr William Pitt, agreed to present the proposals to Parliament.
29 August	Pitt's niece, Griselda - daughter of Earl Stanhope, married John Tickell.
The Autumn	Pitt purchased Tickell's estate at Blackwater.
20 November	Barrackmaster General issued a note of purchase for the Blackwater estate to be used for military training.
2 December	The Duke of York's military committee approved the plans for all except one of the departments.
3 February 1801	Lord Addington replaced Pitt as Prime Minister.
19 June	Duke of York's School Chelsea inaugurated (the <i>Legion</i> - which was to be part of the second department).
24 June	The Military College, High Wycombe established by Royal Warrant.
9 December	Royal Warrant established the governorship of the College.
4 May 1802	The Junior Department (first and second mixed) established by Royal Warrant at Marlow.
17 May	The Junior Department opened.
October - December 1812	The new college buildings completed at Sandhurst (Blackwater) and the Junior Department moved from Marlow.

APPENDIX 3

APPENDIX 3 TO MMAS
 THESIS - BRITISH ARMY
 TRAINING SCHEME



Army Administration 1799 - 1809

NOTES ON THE ADMINISTRATION ----- OF THE BRITISH ARMY -----

The following notes were taken, verbatim, from de Fonblanque's *Treatise on the Administration and Organisation of the British Army*, published in 1858. They are intended as an aid to the reader in understanding the duties and responsibilities of the key appointments concerned with the management of the Army and the Ordnance. These notes are not comprehensive and the reference is recommended to the reader who wishes to understand the full system of command and control of the land force during this period.

1. The Mutiny Act.

It was found no easy matter to limit the power of the Crown (with specific regard to the raising and keeping of a permanent military force at the expense of the nation) in so essential a privilege; and it was not until the reign of William the Third (1689-1702) that the Parliament succeeded in securing to itself the control of the military force, and in imposing those restrictions which, known as "the Mutiny Act", effectually guard the national liberties, and prevent the Army from becoming the instrument of either anarchy or despotism.

The main object and principle of this statute is to render the existence of a standing army dependent upon the will of the people as expressed by Parliament; and its very first clause accordingly declares it to be illegal "to raise or keep up" a military force without the consent of the legislature. The Act fixes the precise number of troops to be maintained for one year, which number cannot be exceeded without a special vote; it authorises and defines the penal code to be established for the trial of military offences, affixing to each crime its limited punishment; it regulates the laws of recruiting and enlistment, and enters into the various details relating to the soldier and the state - always with a view to prevent the possibility of the military element infringing the civil laws of the country and the rights of individuals.

2. Powers of the Sovereign.

But while means are thus adopted to restrain the power of the Army, the prerogative of the Crown is not the less respected; and the Act annually confers upon the Sovereign the right to convoke courts-martial, and to promulgate the articles of war. These clauses, in point of fact, confer upon the Sovereign the legal power of exercising the supreme command of the Army, as the royal prerogative in itself confers the abstract right..... The supreme command of the Army, then, is vested in the crown; but as the Sovereign can do no wrong, the introduction of an intermediate agency becomes necessary as the organ of responsibility.

3. The Secretary of State for War.

The Secretary of State for War is the minister responsible to the country for the efficient maintenance of the military establishments, and the due appropriation of the supplies voted by Parliament; he exercises in person or through his agents, the immediate direction of the administrative duties of the Army at home and abroad, and although, as not holding a military position, he does not interfere with the details of military command, Parliament holds him responsible for the efficiency of the Army and the conduct of warlike operations.

4. Commander-in-Chief.

The purely military duties connected with the administration of the Army are placed under the direction of the General Commanding-in-Chief, who is nominated by, and responsible to, the Crown, for the discipline and efficiency of the service, the conduct and capacity of general and other commanding officers, and the interior economy and organisation of the Army.

He appoints to regimental commissions, and submits the lists of officers for promotion to the Sovereign, after which they are inserted in the "Gazette" by the Secretary of State. He appoints likewise to the staff, but obtains the concurrence of the Secretary of State in all appointments of superior rank. It is also to be understood that the selection of officers for the command in chief of expeditionary forces is made by the Cabinet alone. He decides upon questions relating to the exchange and the retirement of officers; approves and confirms the findings of General Courts-martial; receives the reports of general officers at home and abroad, and issues all regulations referring to the exercises, the arms, the dress, and other details of the interior economy of regiments.

The office of the General Commanding-in-Chief is called the Horse Guards, and the military staff attached to it is as follows: one Military Secretary (promotions, exchanges, retirements, etc.), one Adjutant-General (discipline, promulgation of orders, leave of absence, reports, clothing, etc.), one Quartermaster-General (movements and quarters of troops, routes, embarkations, encampments, surveys), one Deputy Adjutant-General of Artillery and one of Engineers (staff duties connected with their respective corps).

5. Other Independent Departments.

Up to the commencement of the Russian war (1854) the Secretary of State for the Colonies was charged with the political and civil administration of the Army, and the various branches of the military service were directed by a number of distinct and independent departments which rendered unity and promptness of action extremely difficult, and tended to break the chain of official responsibility. Thus the Commander-in-Chief's functions were purely military, and extended to cavalry and infantry only; the Master-General of the Ordnance superintended and commanded the artillery and engineer services; the Secretary-at-War conducted the finance; and the Treasury had charge of the Commissariat.

The inconvenience of carrying on a war at a distance from home by means of so complicated and disjointed a machine soon made itself evident and a consolidation of departments under a responsible minister was one of the happiest results of the late war; the Colonial Secretary now resigned his connexion with the Army, the office of Master-General was abolished, and the Ordnance corps were placed under the Commander-in-Chief; the ancient office of Secretary-at-War (author's note - he had originally been the King's private secretary at the War Department) was absorbed in the new institutions, and the Commissariat was placed under the direction of the War Department.

APPENDIX 4

OUTLINES
of a
PLAN FOR A REGULAR COURSE
of
MILITARY EDUCATION

(Presented by Lieutenant Colonel Le Marchant on the 4th May 1799)

The different periods of life at which persons enter into the British service, render it impossible that everyone should be alike capable of pursuing a regular course of education. It becomes necessary, therefore, to adapt the system of instruction to the particular circumstances which characterize the British Army, without regard to the mode of military education observed by other nations, or the regular course of study usually pursued for the attainment of science.

It is proposed then, to found a military college, to be conducted under the direction of officers of approved ability; over which establishment the Commander-in-Chief should preside as Chancellor.

The immediate object of this institution would be, "to instruct the mass of the service in the degree of science requisite to subordinate stations; and to afford the means to a perfect education to those who, aspiring to rank and responsibility, apply early to the study of their profession."

To effect these purposes, the instruction must be arranged and conducted under separate courses of study, forming three distinct departments of the college, each appropriated to the views under which individuals may enter into the service as officers; at the same time extending the plan of education to the ranks, by the instruction of soldiers' sons, who may eventually become intelligent non-commissioned officers, and be made capable of filling with credit even staff situations in the several corps of the army (this was to be the Legion which was not agreed as part of the final approved scheme but came into existence separately as the Duke of York's Military School. Author's note - "one may reasonably wonder whether Le Marchant had foreseen such obstacles to his plans for officer education that he, rightly, deduced that a sacrificial goat of this sort would deflect adverse comment from the larger scheme").

The first of the three departments to be for the instruction of youth in the several branches of science, after having finished their classical studies.

The second for cadets of the army, and soldiers' sons; who will be formed to the practical duties of the service.

The third is intended for the improvement of the staff of the army. (The object of instruction attached to this department, is anticipated by the arrangements made for an academy in Buckinghamshire).

FIRST DEPARTMENT

for the instruction of youth

This department would constitute the junior course, and be calculated for the instruction of those who are from early life intended for the military profession; and who, by becoming students in this department, may be well grounded in science, previous to their attaining that age which entitles them to hold commissions. (Authors' note - the usual minimum age for a commission was seventeen).

The principal points of instruction to which their attention would be directed, consist in the study of Moral and Natural Philosophy; Logic; the several branches of Mathematics; Geography; History; and a knowledge of the German and French languages; to which may be added, if deemed expedient, Dancing, Fencing and Riding.

Quarterly examinations to be held for the several degrees, when those students who adopt the service, will eventually remove from the first to the second department of the College.

The students to be admitted from the age of thirteen to fifteen (in order to obviate the disadvantages that would arise in the loss of rank to those who became students at fifteen, it will be requisite to allow students to lodge their money for vacancies at sixteen, and their rank to bear date from that period without interruption to their studies.), and with the approbation of the resident governor. They are to be boarded, and educated in the several branches of science; the particulars of which will be hereafter detailed in the regulations of the Department, and this at a fixed allowance of seventy pounds annually for each student, free of all other charges whatsoever (the sum allowed to the master for each student, is calculated upon the ground that the College be exempted from the payment of taxes, in like manner with the Military Establishment at Woolwich).

The number of students admitted to this department must be limited, at the same time that the benefit of the Institution should be confined as

much as possible to the instruction of officers' sons, and those who may be intended for the service; but as the requirements treated of enter into a furnished education, equally whether men are designed for civil or military stations, the regulations of the departments should not operate to the exclusion of those whose rank and circumstances entitle them to aspire to elevated stations.

The Master to be appointed by the Chancellor, and in consideration of the privileges attached to the Institution, to subject himself to the control of the Governors of the College, and to the rules and regulations prescribed for the department.

SECOND DEPARTMENT for the cadets of the army, and soldiers' sons

CADETS

This first branch of the department is calculated to inform the body of the army, by instructing those who enter the service without being, by previous education, qualified to become officers.

With this in view, every person, before a commission is granted to him, must be required to enter as a cadet, in order that he may attain a competent knowledge of the service; and by passing an examination in that probationary state, prove himself equal to the duties of a subaltern officer.

The cadets will do duty with a legion, consisting of four companies, formed from two hundred soldiers' sons, recruited without bounty, who are to be educated on the establishment on the practical duties of that service to which their natural genius may lead them. (Author's note - this form of practical tuition was never realised in the sense that Le Marchant meant. However local militia regiments were often required to produce soldiers to join the training of the cadets and today an enhanced company of infantry is permanently attached to the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst to assist in the training of the cadets).

The course of instruction attached to this department would be elementary in point of science; whilst its practice would be directed to every situation comprised in regimental arrangements, whether of cavalry or infantry.

The cadets of both services would be taught plain geometry and trigonometry; to make sketches of an outpost or country when sent on patrol (sic); to draw the different manoeuvres treated of in his Majesty's regulations, writing therein the words of command appropriated to every rank that directs the execution of each movement; and, as far as time and circumstances might admit, employ such means to confirm them in a knowledge of the theory, as would insure their becoming correct and intelligent officers in practice.

Such cadets as were intended for the cavalry, would be instructed in horsemanship and the use of the sword. They would be attached to that division of the Legion which is mounted and formed to the cavalry service; thereby become acquainted with the treatment of horses, and the interior economy of a regiment in quarters, as well as with its movements in the field. Their drills would be conducted indiscriminantly together with the Legion, in order to unite practice with theory, which is indispensably necessary to a perfect knowledge of a military system.

Upon the same principle, the cadets destined for the infantry will be attached to companies, and receive instructions in the several branches of duty which relate to that particular service.

In order to obtain admission to the College, as cadet, every person should first be approved of by the commanding officer of a regiment, as successor to a vacant commission (and if by purchase, the purchase-money should be lodged with the regimental agent, by whom application would be made to the Chancellor for an order of admission). Cadets, intended for the cavalry service, to remain six months at the College; and those designed for the infantry, to continue three months (in time of peace their residence would be for a longer period); during which time the Paymaster should draw on their respective agents monthly; for the former, at the rate of four shillings per day, and two shillings and fourpence for the latter, being for the purpose of defraying the expenses of the department.

Each cavalry cadet to take with him his charger, in order to be broke at the riding-school, and enable him to attend his military exercise, for which forage and stable will be allowed.

Accommodation for the cadets to be provided in the college, and messes to be established on reasonable terms; the same attendance to be allowed as is usual at the universities, as no servants should be admitted to this establishment.

The cadets to pass two examinations for their degree; which having taken they should be entitled to hold commissions in the several corps for which they were intended. Notice of their having received such degree to be officially transmitted by the Board to the Chancellor, and their commissions made out, antedated to the period at which they entered the College. (Author's note - this was clearly to encourage applications at the earliest age as all cadets were to be commissioned aged seventeen years.)

LEGION

Author's Note:

This section of Le Marchant's resume of his training scheme has been omitted as it was rejected entirely by the Military Committee which was presided over by the Commander-in-Chief. It is the author's belief that the idea of mixing soldiers' sons with officer cadets in close proximity for training purposes was so outlandish a plan that Le Marchant must have known that it would fail and that he deliberately introduced it to draw-off criticism of the rest of the scheme.

THIRD DEPARTMENT for improvement of the staff

This department is intended only for officers of experience in the duties of regimental service, who possess a competent knowledge of the several branches of science pursued in the junior departments of the College.

The immediate purpose of this institution is, to lead progressively from minutiae to a knowledge of military operations, upon those principles which direct the great scale of war, and thereby to expand the genius, that responsibility may not precede information; for though no reluctance is felt in acknowledging inexperience while in subordinate stations, yet, having once arrived at rank, enquiry after information too naturally ceases, from a dread of ridicule, or the galling imputation of incapacity.

The instruction appropriated to this third department of the College will be calculated to qualify officers to become aid-de-camps (sic), and fill other staff(1) appointments with the ability due to their high importance. It will explain the nature of the country, and form the eye to that perfect knowledge of ground, which is necessary to a judicious choice of position, and to the conduct of offensive and defensive war.

It will point out the modes of attack and defence, appropriated to local situation, with the several duties inseparable from an advanced corps, co-operating with the movements of an army.

It will minutely detail the sections that compose an army, and specify the proportion that troops of each branch of service should bear to each other.

It will enumerate the different departments of any army, comprised under the heads of Civil and Military staff; enter into the particular duties of each, their relative powers, and their connection with the general conduct of the army, as well as what relates to the interior system, as to its service in the field; the principle upon which movements are conducted, and the general motives that determine the choice of position for an army, both in the field and in cantonments.

It will treat of the great principle which should regulate command, and the policy requisite to high authority, in order to maintain discipline, inspire energy in the troops, and insure a perfect co-operation in every branch of the service. It will point out generally the resources of an army, in the various means of procuring supplies of forage and provisions; the power of influencing the good disposition and support of the natural inhabitants of a country that may be the theatre of war; through whose means intelligence of the enemy can be obtained, with the several other aids so indispensable to the operations of active service.

Finally, it will show the proper administration of finance, in regulating the expenditure by the receipt, and checking the accounts of the several departments.

Officers, who have been less than four years in the army, will not be considered eligible to enter on this course of military study.

Apartments to be provided in the College, where each officer will be allowed forage for two horses, and accommodation for one servant.

Every necessary convenience, with the means of messing, will be attached to the establishment, subject, however, to the rules of the Institution.

Application to the Chancellor for admission, is to be made through the commanding officers of corps.

No person under the rank of a field officer will be adequate to conduct this department, as the instruction he will be required to give can only result from great ability and much experience.

Note:

1. In the Austrian service, the knowledge necessary to Staff Officers is properly considered of such high importance as to have given rise to an Establishment for the express purpose of instructing men of ability and qualifying them for commands. They are incorporated under the denomination of the Etat-Major, and are employed on all services that require intelligence and ability.

The College being divided into three departments, it is not requisite to the system of instruction that the whole plan should be adopted at the same time: any part may be separately established, and the plan afterwards completed, as circumstances may render advisable.

The detail of rules and regulations for the College, the immediate course of instruction proposed, together with the examinations to be made in every branch of science appropriated to the several departments, are omitted, it being the immediate object to submit for consideration the Outlines of a plan, which may be readily completed, if found deserving farther notice.

HEADS OF THE COLLEGE

Chancellor and Commander-in-Chief

Governor

Lieutenant Governor

Superintendent

The Governor is not to be under the rank of Major General, and will be required to take an active concern in the conduct of the institution.

The Lieutenant Governor and Superintendent are not to be under the rank of Field Officer. They are to reside at the College, and one of them invariably be present.

In the absence of the Chancellor, the Senior Officer is to be invested with the entire control over every department, in all matters that relate to the good order and strict adherence to the established rules and regulations. And no alterations or amendments are to be made out but by order of the Chancellor.

A Board will sit at stated periods to examine the junior departments for their several degrees, and transact such business as may be under their immediate cognizance.

APPENDIX 5

**GENERAL ORDER AND REGULATIONS
FOR THE STAFF COLLEGE**

17 DECEMBER 1857

The following Orders were extracted from AR Godwin-Austen's book *The Staff and The Staff College*:

1. The College was to be open to all arms of the Service, and its establishment to consist of 30 students: 25 from the Cavalry, Guards, and the Line, and 5 from the two Ordnance corps. Admission was to be by competitive examination.
2. The payment of thirty guineas was to be abolished: no fee would be required from students.
3. Qualifications for admission to the entrance examination were:
 - a. Three years' service.
 - b. A certificate from the candidate's commanding officer to the effect that the officer concerned was intelligent, zealous, and well conducted, and thoroughly acquainted with all his duties.
 - c. If the candidate were a subaltern he must have passed the examination for promotion for the command of a troop or company.
 - d. A certificate of medical fitness for active duty on the Staff.
4. The subjects for the entrance examination were to be:

Qualifying minimum

Compulsory - Mathematics...	...1200 marks.....	300
French.....	300.....	75

Optional - Military History	
and geography.....	900
German.....	300
Fortification.....	300
Military Drawing....	300
Geology.....	150
Chemistry.....	150

A warning was given that the standard would be raised as candidates had more time for preparation. After 1858 the candidate "will in addition be expected to have a sufficient use of the pencil to be able to draw from an example or object placed before him."

5. The College course was to open annually on February 1; was to last two years, which period might not be exceeded, and was to be divided into two terms, viz:

February 1 to June 15.
July 15 to December 15.

6. The course at the College was to include:

Mathematics - Euclid, Algebra, Mensuration, Trigonometry and their application to elementary mechanics.

French

German and Hindustani (optional)

Fortification and Artillery.

Topography, Surveying, Sketching and Reconnaissance.

Military Art (Strategy). Military History and Geography.

Military Administration and Military Law

Elements of Natural Philosophy, Chemistry and Geology.

Special attention was to be given to exercising students in composition.

Riding.

7. Monthly progress reports were to be submitted to the Council of Education by the Commandant, through the Governor of the Royal Military College.

8. Students were to be formed into two divisions, senior and junior (first and second year men), and would be examined every half-year. The summer examinations to be conducted by professors of the College, and those at the end of the winter term by independent examiners. The examination at the end of the first year was to be probationary: failure or unlikelihood of passing the final examination would entail removal, though a student might be removed at any time.

9. The allotment of marks in the final examination was to be:

Mathematics.....	600
Fortification and Artillery.....	600
Military Drawing and Surveying.....	300
Reconnaissance.....	400
Military Art, Military History and Geography.....	600
Military Administration and Law.....	300
French.....	300

A qualifying minimum of 50 per cent. was required in each subject.

The following marks were to be optional. A candidate must make 100 marks in any of these before he might count any. Each carried 300 marks:

German
Hindustani
Natural Philosophy, Chemistry and Geology, as
applied to military science.

10. Officers who satisfied the conditions of entry (see 3, above), but who did not wish to undergo the course or preferred to spend only one year at the College, were, with the Commander-in-Chief's permission, to be allowed to undergo the final examination, or, if desirous of attending for the second year only, provided a vacancy existed, to take the examination set for the Junior Division at the end of the first year, and attend for the second year.

11. The Order of 9th April 1857(1) was to continue in force until 1st January 1860, after which date no officer would be appointed to the Staff who had not passed the final examination at the Staff College.

12. The names of students successful in the final examination were to be reported to the Commander-in-Chief, arranged in three classes according to merit, with a special report on those who particularly distinguished themselves. After passing-out, officers were to be attached to arms of the Service other than their own for six months. Commanding officers to whose units they were attached were to report on them to the Adjutant-General.

Besides framing the above regulations, the Council recorded some additional remarks which were to encourage students to pursue their studies in mathematics far beyond the compulsory instruction. A programme of studies was compiled prescribing three lectures, each of one-and-a-half hours and one of two hours daily. One hours' riding instruction was to be given every other day. Two months were to be devoted at the end of the second year to "independent study preparatory to the final examination", assisted by the professors of the College.

The establishment of professors was to be nine, four of whom were to be officers entitled - "professors in military subjects".

It was further recommended that a list of applicants to undergo the entrance examination be kept, "the number summoned to attend....being so regulated by the Council as to ensure an active competition."

The Council ended by stating:

The adoption of the name Staff College....was in itself a most important step, as it recognised the real object of the institution, and...left no room for doubt on the mind of any officer who should obtain admission to the Staff College that by perfecting himself in the course of studies and professional training pursued in that establishment, and passing with credit through his term of residence, he would secure for himself a staff appointment; no other channel for admission to the Staff being left open after the 1st January 1860, excepting in the case of officers either of the rank of lieutenant colonel at that particular date, or who had proved in the field their fitness for staff appointments.

1. AR Godwin_Austen. The Staff and The Staff College, pp.97-99.

APPENDIX 6

APPENDIX 6 TO MMAS
THESIS - BRITISH ARMY
TRAINING SCHEME

TABLE OF SENIOR APPOINTMENTS IN THE BRITISH ARMY
AND IN THE OFFICER TRAINING SCHEME 1795 - 1858

DATE	SEC-AT-WAR	SEC-OF-STATE	C-in-C	GOVERNOR	LT-GOVN'R	COMDT
1795	William Wyndham	Henry Dundas	Duke of York			
1801	Thomas *Pelham	Lord Hobart		Gen Lord Harcourt	Lt Col Le Marchant	Lt Col Butler (Jun Dept) and Maj Douglas (Sen Dept)
1803	*Charles York					
1804	Lord *Hawkesbury	Lord Camden				
1805		Lord Castlereagh				
1806	George Spencer	William Wyndham				
1807	Lord Granville	Lord Castlereagh				
1809	Richard Ryder	Lord Liverpool	Gen David Dundas			
1811			Duke of York		Gen Alex Hope	
1812	*Lord Sidmouth	Lord Bathurst		Gen Alex Hope	<---Lt Col Butler----> (Jun Dept)	
1819				Gen George Murray		
1822	*Robert Peel					
1824				Gen Alex Hope		John Narrien Esq (Sen Dept)
1826				Gen Edward Paget		

(Notes: * indicates duties undertaken by Minister for Home Affairs.
h indicates post admitted to the Cabinet May 1834.)

DATE	SEC-AT-WAR	SEC-OF-STATE	C-in-C	GOVERNOR	LT-GOVN'R	COMDT
1827	Lord Palmerston	Lord Goderich & William Huskisson	Duke of Wellington			
1828		Sir George Murray	Lord Hill		Col George Scovell	
1830	Lord Melbourne	Lord Goderich				
1833	Edward Ellice	Lord Stanley				
1834		Thomas Rice				
1835	John Herries & Henry Grey	George Gordon & Charles Grant				
1837				Gen George Scovell	Col Taylor	
1839	Thomas Macauley	Constantine Phipps				
1841	Henry Hardinge	Lord Stanley				
1842			Duke of Wellington			
1845	Sidney Herbert	William Gladstone				
1846		Henry Grey				
1851	Fox Maule					
1852	Spencer Walpole	John Pakington	Lord Hardinge			
1853	Sidney Herbert	Duke of Newcastle				
1854					Col Prosser	
1855	<-----Lord Panmure----->				Col Scott	
1856			Duke of Cambridge	Gen Harry Jones		

APPENDIX 7

APPENDIX 7 TO MMAS
THESIS - BRITISH ARMY
TRAINING SCHEME

LIST OF OFFICERS SERVING IN THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S AND
QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENTS IN THE PENINSULAR WAR
BETWEEN 1 APRIL 1809 AND 25 JUNE 1814

Notes:

1. This list is extracted from a more comprehensive list prepared by SGP Ward from the General Orders of the Army and the monthly returns contained in the Murray Papers. Ward's list is included as an appendix in his book Wellington's Headquarters which itself is included in the Bibliography of this thesis.

2. Abbreviations used to describe the roles individuals were first appointed to were in common use until 1977: Adjutant-General (AG), Quartermaster-General (QMG), Assistant... (A...), Deputy... (D...), Deputy Assistant... (DA...).

<u>DATE OF APPT</u>	<u>ROLE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
(THE STAFF OF THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL)			
12 May 1810	AAG Cav Div	Maj CP Ainslie	4th Dragoons
6 Oct 1810	DAAG 6 Div	Capt SB Auchmuty (Gen)	7th Fusiliers
1 Apr 1809	AAG 1 Div	LtCol M Aylmer (Gen)	DAG from 1 Jan 1812
23 Jan 1810	DAAG 2 Div	Lt C Bayley	31st Foot
1 Apr 1809	AAG 5 Div	Maj GHF Berkley (Gen)	35th Foot
18 Apr 1812	AAG 1 Div	Capt HF Bouverie (Gen)	COLDM GDS
20 Nov 1811	AAG 6 Div	LtCol Sir HH Bradford	2/11th Foot
			died at Waterloo
12 Apr 1812	Comdt Belem	Lt TH Browne (Lt Gen)	23rd Foot
1 Jul 1809	DAAG	Capt AW Campbell	74th Foot
			died Bilboa Oct 1813
1 Apr 1809	AAG &HQ Comdt	Maj C Campbell (Gen)	70th Foot
3 Sep 1811	AAG Cadiz	LtCol Hon TE Capel (Gen)	1st Guards
24 Oct 1812	DAAG 2 Div	Capt CH Churchill (Col)	1st Guards; Hill's MS
1 Apr 1809	DAAG 4 Div	Capt F Cockburn (Gen)	60th Foot
3 May 1809	DAAG 4 Div	Lt HF Cooke (MajGen)	COLDM GDS, att staff
			N America 23 Jul 1812
1 Apr 1809	DAAG 2 Div	Lt W Cotton (Gen)	3rd Guards
14 Oct 1810	DAAG 4 Div	Capt H Craig (Col)	30th Foot, later DAAG
			Lisbon
19 Apr 1814	AAG	Maj WL Darling (Gen)	2nd Garrison Bn
1 Apr 1809	AAG	LtCol D Darroch (Gen)	36th Foot
1 Apr 1809	DAAG 4 Div	Capt C Dashwood	3rd Guards

DATE OF APPT	ROLE	NAME	REMARKS
30 Nov 1811	AAG 1 Div	Maj F D'Oyly	1st Guards died at Waterloo
1 Apr 1809	DAAG at HQ	Lt G von During (LtGen)	1st KGL (Prussian)
3 Oct 1812	DAAG Cav Div	Capt N Eckersley	Royal Horse Guards
11 Aug 1810	DAAG	Capt R Egerton (LtGen)	34th Foot
1 Apr 1809	AAG Cav Div	LtCol J Elley (LtGen)	Royal Horse Guards
1 Apr 1809	DAAG	Capt G Elliott	48th Foot; transfer to QMG 30 May 1809
25 Apr 1813	DAAG	Capt G Fitzclarence (MajGen)	10th Hussars; adc to Stewart from 1809
26 Mar 1812	DAAG 2 Div	Lt Lord C Fitzroy	1st Guards
26 Jun 1809	Bde-Major	Capt A Fordyce	81st Foot
25 Aug 1809	DJAG	Capt SA Goodman	48th Foot
1 Apr 1809	DAAG 3 Div	Capt HCE Graham (Gen)	26th Foot
21 Feb 1810	DAAG Cadiz	Capt RG Hare (LtGen)	23rd Foot
4 May 1811	DAAG	Capt TN Harris	13th Dragoons
3 Apr 1812	DAAG 2 Div	Capt A Heise	2nd KGL (Prussian)
1 Apr 1809	AAG	LtCol H von Hinuber	68th Foot; att to Paget's Bde
16 May 1810	DAAG	Lt WR Hoey	18th Hussars died at Bucaco 1810
12 Dec 1813	AAG 2 Div	Capt Hon FW Hood	3rd Guards
25 Feb 1813	AAG	Maj JA Hope (Gen)	90th Foot; att to Graham's column
14 Sep 1812	sub-dep AAG	Lt J Hurford	Comm from the ranks into 13th Veterans Bn
5 Aug 1811	DAAG 5 Div	Capt F James	81st Foot; died from wounds at Badajoz
1 Apr 1809	AG	Brig Hon C Stewart (Gen)	Absent Dec 1809-Jan 1810, Dec 1810-5 Jan 1811, 9 Jan-24 May 1811, and from 8 Apr 1812. Resigned appt 10 May 1813
11 May 1811	DAAG Cav Div	Capt A Macdonald (LtGen)	45th Foot
24 Feb 1810	AAG Cadiz	Maj J MacDonald (Gen)	1st Garrison Bn; Head of Dept under Graham Later AG to Forces 1830-1850
12 Jul 1812	AAG Cadiz	Maj EJ MacGregor (MajGen)	103rd Foot
11 May 1811	DAAG	Lt M'Mullin	63rd Foot
23 Nov 1812	DAAG Lisbon	Capt B Marlay	14th Foot
1 Apr 1809	DAAG 4 Div	Capt HF Mellish	87th Foot
25 Apr 1813	DAAG	Capt GAF Munster (MajGen)	10th Hussars
29 Jan 1814	AAG 6 Div	LtCol BT Napier (Gen)	52nd Foot; appt lasted 6 days
20 Nov 1811	DAAG	Capt K Osborne	5th Dragoon Guards

DATE OF APPT	ROLE	NAME	REMARKS
15 Nov 1809	AAG	Col EM Packenham (MajGen)	Appt DAG 3 Mar 1810 Acting AG during Stewart's absences AG from 10 May 1813
1 Sep 1809	DAAG 3 Div	Capt H Packenham (LtGen)	95th Foot; wounded Badajoz 7 Apr 1812
2 Jan 1810	AAG	Maj FC Ponsonby (MajGen)	23rd Lt Dragoons
14 Nov 1810	AAG 4 Div	LtCol T Reynell (LtGen)	71st Foot
10 Apr 1810	AAG 2 Div	Capt JC Rooke	3rd Guards; mortally wounded Nivelles 10 Nov 1813
15 Mar 1811	DAAG	Capt C Rowan	52nd Foot; later AAG to Lt Div
10 Nov 1812	AAG to Paget	Maj JHK Stewart	95th Foot; transfer to QMG 28 Nov 1812
3 May 1812	DAAG 3 Div	Capt F Stovin (Gen)	28th Foot
1 Apr 1809	AAG	Maj FS Tidy	14th Foot
10 Jan 1810	DAAG to Payne	Capt Trip van Zoudtlant	11th Foot
11 Apr 1812	DAAG 4 Div	Capt C Tryon	88th Foot
15 Apr 1811	AAG	Capt J Waters (Gen)	1st Foot; Acting AG Autumn 1812
11 Apr 1812	DAAG	Capt C White	COLDM GDS
1 Apr 1809	AAG to 3 Div	Maj T Williamson	30th Foot
25 Feb 1812	DAAG	Lt C Wood	52nd Foot
16 Sep 1811	DAAG Cadiz	Lt WC Wynyard	COLDM GDS

(THE STAFF OF THE QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL)

4 Feb 1813	AQMG 6 Div	LtCol A Abercrombie	28th Foot Sen Dept RMC 1801-2
19 Feb 1810	DAQMG 4 Div	Capt TOP Anderdon	7th Fusiliers Sen Dept RMC 1808
25 Jun 1813	AQMG 3 Div	LtCol T Arbuthnot (LtGen)	5th W India Regt
18 Sep 1810	DAQMG	Capt P Bainbrigge (LtGen)	93rd Foot Sen Dept RMC 1810
1 Apr 1809	DAQMG	Lt G Balck	KGL (Prussian)
1 Apr 1809	AQMG	LtCol J Bathurst (LtGen)	60th Foot; MS to Wellington 1809-1810 Sen Dept RMC 1802
3 Aug 1812	DAQMG Lt Div	Capt JC Beckwith (MajGen)	95th Foot
6 Aug 1810	DAQMG Lt Div	Lt J Bell (Gen)	52nd Foot
1 Apr 1809	DAQMG Lisbon	Capt W Beresford	8th Garrison Bn Sen Dept RMC 1808
1 Apr 1809	AQMG	Maj G Blaquiére	Permanent Staff until Jul 1809

DATE OF APPT	ROLE	NAME	REMARKS
1 Apr 1809	AQMG to Cuesta	LtCol R Bourke (Gen)	Permanant Staff Sen Dept RMC 1801-2
25 Feb 1812	DAQMG	Capt H Bristow (MajGen)	11th Foot Sen Dept RMC 1809
18 Dec 1809	AQMG	Maj C Broke (MajGen)	5th Foot Sen Dept RMC 1799-1803
18 Jul 1810	DAQMG 1 Div	Capt Brownrigg	52nd Foot
18 Aug 1810	DAQMG Cadiz	Lt JV Bryant	44th Foot
19 Nov 1809	DAQMG 3 Div	Capt W Campbell (MajGen)	23rd Foot
23 Feb 1810	AQMG Cadiz	Maj C Cathcart (Gen)	Permanant Staff Sen Dept RMC 1800-3
1 Apr 1809	DAQMG	Lt HF Cooke (MajGen)	COLDM GDS; transfer to AG Dept 3 May 1809
25 Apr 1809	AQMG	Maj ERJ Cotton (MajGen)	10th Foot
17 Jul 1809	DAQMG	Capt JM Cutcliffe	23rd Lt Dragoons
1 Apr 1809	Dep QMG	LtCol WH de Lancey	Permanant Staff Sen Dept RMC 1801-2
15 Sep 1812	AQMG 7 Div	Maj J Dickson (LtGen)	Permanant Staff Sen Dept RMC 1802
9 May 1809	DAQMG	Capt CJ Doyle (MajGen)	87th Foot
16 May 1811	DAQMG	Capt T Drake	95th Foot; attended Sen Dept RMC twice in 1807 & 1810
29 Apr 1813	DAQMG 4 Div	Capt H Dumaresq	3rd Garrison Bn
1 Apr 1809	AQMG	LtCol B D'Urban (LtGen)	2nd W Indian Regt; QMG Portuguese Army 20 Apr 1809 Sen Dept RMC 1803
30 May 1809	DAQMG	Capt G Elliott	48th Foot; transfer from AG's Department
13 Mar 1814	DAQMG	Lt G deL Evans (Gen)	3rd Dragoons; Command 2 Div in Crimea 1854 RMA Woolwich 1800-4
6 Aug 1813	DAQMG 7 Div	Capt R Forrest	3rd Foot (the Buffs)
3 Aug 1812	AQMG Lisbon	Maj W Geddes	83rd Foot
6 Dec 1811	DAQMG Coimbra	Capt N Gledstones	68th Foot; Advised to resign by Gordon for neglect of duty on retreat from Burgos Dec 1812 Sen Dept RMC 1809
1 Sep 1810	DAQMG 5 Div	Cart WM Gomm (FM)	9th Foot Sen Dept RMC 1806
8 May 1812	QMG	Col JW Gordon (Gen)	Royal Africa Corps QMG of Forces to 1851
20 Mar 1814	AQMG	Maj C Grant	11th Foot; DIC Guides and the Post Office

DATE OF APPT	ROLE	NAME	REMARKS
19 Dec 1813	DAQMS 2 Div	Lt JC Griffiths	94th Foot
12 Oct 1811	DAQMS Cadiz	Lt J de Guanter	Chasseurs Brittanique
2 May 1810	DAQMS Cadiz	Lt J Hamilton	COLDM GDS; Head of Dept Cadiz from 30 Jan 1812 as LtCol
1 Apr 1809	DAQMS	Capt RJ Harvey (Gen)	53rd Foot; Attached to Portuguese Army, Intelligence officer Sen Dept RMC 1809
1 Apr 1809	DAQMS	Capt J Haverfield	48th Foot Sen Dept RMC 1804-6
12 Aug 1810	DAQMS to Hill	Capt R Heathcote	Royal Dragoons
28 Nov 1812	DAQMS 5 Div	Capt WL Herries (LtGen)	Meuron's (a locally formed militia) Sen Dept RMC 1806
25 May 1809	DAQMS	Capt G Humphrey	27th Foot
19 Sep 1812	DAQMS	Capt T Hutchins	3rd Dragoons Sen Dept RMC 1809
31 Mar 1811	AQMS 1 Div	Capt RD Jackson (LtGen)	COLDM GDS Sen Dept RMC 1800-2
1 Apr 1809	DAQMS	Capt D Kelly	27th Foot
31 Oct 1809	DAQMS	Capt E Kelly	Royal Dragoons; Attended RMC 1810 and returned to Peninsular 1813
25 Aug 1812	DAQMS Cadiz	Capt F Kirchberger	de Wattville's (a locally formed militia)
1 Apr 1809	DAQMS	Capt A Langton	61st Foot Sen Dept RMC 1806
5 Nov 1812	DAQMS	Lt W Light	4th Dragoons
1 Apr 1809	DAQMS	Capt W Mackenzie	42nd Foot
8 May 1810	AQMS Coimbra	Maj M Marston	48th Foot
1 Apr 1809	DAQMS	Capt JH Maw	23rd Foot
7 May 1809	DAQMS 1 Div	Lt R Mercer	3rd Guards Sen Dept RMC 1803-4
28 Oct 1812	DAQMS 2 Div	Capt H Montgomery	50th Foot Sen Dept RMC 1811
1 Apr 1809	DAQMS Lisbon	Lt W Morgenthal	60th Foot
1 Apr 1809	QMS	Col G Murray	"Wellington's Right- Hand". Sec of State 1828-30, MGO 1834-5 and 1841-6 Sen Dept RMC 1802
1 Apr 1809	AQMS Lisbon	Maj LA Northey	Permanent Staff Sen Dept RMC 1802-3
31 Mar 1811	AQMS to Hill	LtCol OW Offeney	KGL (Prussian)


DATE OF APPT	ROLE	NAME	REMARKS
30 Nov 1811	DAQMG 3 Div	Capt K Osborne	5th Dragoon Guards; transferred from AG Sen Dept RMC 1808
3 Aug 1812	DAQMG	Capt FJ Percy	23rd Foot
10 Apr 1811	DAQMG	Capt CA Pierrepont	Permanent Staff
24 Jul 1811	DAQMG Lisbon	Lt A Porteus	61st Foot
25 Feb 1811	DAQMG Cadiz	Lt R Read	82nd Foot
14 Dec 1813	AQMG	Maj W Read	Permanent Staff
1 Apr 1809	DAQMG at HQ	Capt JH Reynett (Gen)	52nd Foot
1 Apr 1809	DAQMG	Capt G Scovell (Gen)	57th Foot; later Governor of the Jun Dept Sandhurst Sen Dept RMC 1808
11 Oct 1812	DAQMG 1 Div	Lt JH Stanhope	1st Guards
11 Jun 1813	DAQMG	Capt W Staveley (LtGen)	Royal African Corps
10 Aug 1811	DAQMG 6 Div	Capt JHK Stewart	95th Foot; attached AAG to 1 Div Nov-Dec 1811
15 Jan 1810	DAQMG at HQ	Capt NT Still	3rd Foot (Bufs) Sen Dept RMC 1809
25 Apr 1813	AQMG	LtCol RH Sturgeon	Royal Staff Corps; took over Guides and Post Office from Scovell.
1 Apr 1809	DAQMG	Capt M Sutton	97th Foot
25 May 1809	DAQMG Oporto	Lt JC de Tasm	Portuguese Engineers
3 Mar 1810	DAQMG 2 Div	Capt N Thorn (Lt Gen)	3rd Foot (Bufs) Sen Dept RMC 1807
28 Sep 1813	AQMG	Maj R Torrens	1st W India Regt
31 Oct 1809	DAQMG	Capt G Tweeddale (FM)	1st Guards
28 Oct 1812	AQMG 1 Div	Capt AP Upton (Gen)	1st Guards
29 Aug 1812	DAQMG 6 Div	Capt W Vincent	82nd Foot Sen Dept RMC 1809
20 Mar 1810	DAQMG Cadiz	Lt I Walker	88th Foot
1 Apr 1809	DAQMG 2 Div	Capt R Waller	103rd Foot Sen Dept RMC 1802-4
12 Nov 1810	DAQMG	Capt W White	13th Light Dragoons Sen Dept RMC 1802-5
25 Apr 1809	DAQMG	Capt Whittingham (LtGen)	13th Light Dragoons; Already a BrigGen in Spanish service Sen Dept RMC 1806
25 Jun 1813	DAQMG	Lt JG Woodford (LtGen)	1st Guards

Note: Out of a total of 83 officers who served on the staff of the Quartermaster-General between 1809-1814, 32 had attended the Senior Department and 17 of these officers were serving on the staff in 1814.


APPENDIX B

APPENDIX B TO MMAS
 THESIS - BRITISH ARMY
 TRAINING SCHEME

SKETCH MAPS OF THE BATTLES
 OF SALAMANCA AND BALACLAVA



SALAMANCA



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